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Abstract 
This paper examines the effect of Quantitative Easing (QE) on listed companies and sectors in 
South Africa. The unconventional monetary policy carried out by the developed markets had 
spill over effects in emerging market economies. We focus on the policies performed by the 
United States. Our interest is to find out whether the QE announcements had any impact on the 
returns of listed companies and sectors in South Africa. 
An exploratory analysis is done on the macroeconomic and financial indicators in SA to 
provide grounds for doing the analysis on the listed companies. This analysis shows that the 
exchange rate and portfolio inflows were impacted by QE. However, other local factors were 
in play in affecting the exchange rate. The shrinkage in the global economic activity affected 
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate. The changes in inflation cannot be attributed 
to QE. Most of the portfolio inflows were in the bond market and since some were directed to 
the equity market we proceed to check whether stocks and sectors had abnormal returns as a 
result. 
Our empirical analysis shows that only three companies had significant Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns (CARs) in the three phases of QE. On the sector front, nine out of the 34 sectors had 
significant CARs every time QE was announced. A broader classification of these sectors into 
industries shows that the industries represented are industrials, consumer goods, consumer 
services and financials.  In QE1, the industrials industry and the consumer services industry 
had negative CARs but in QE2 and QE3, they had positive CARs. The consumer goods 
industry had positive CARs during the three phases of QE. This research concludes that QE1 
had the greatest impact on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) and its impact was negative. 
QE2 had a positive impact on the JSE since most companies and sectors had significant positive 
CARs. The impact of QE3 on sector abnormal returns was almost neutral. 
We also provide an investment strategy on the JSE using various indices for the periods 
following QE2 and QE3. Out of the 14 indices used, the small caps index is given a higher 
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1. Introduction  
The global financial crisis (GFC) in 2007-2008 has been recorded as the worst financial crisis 
since the great depression. The entire financial system weakened and large financial institutions 
collapsed. This triggered massive bailout from national governments to avert a full-blown 
collapse of the global economy. In addition, central banks around the world pursued an eased 
monetary policy in which they cut interest rates to near zero to encourage borrowing and 
leveraging by the private sector. These actions were not as effective as desired. Both consumer 
and investor confidence continued to drop and the financial markets remained fragile and on a 
downward trend due to liquidity constraints and uncertainty. It is at this point that the Federal 
Reserve Bank (Fed) of the United States (US) began to experiment with unconventional 
monetary measures. 
This thesis focuses on quantitative easing (QE), which is an unconventional monetary policy 
pursued by the Fed in the US, between 2008 and 2014. This was implemented in three phases. 
The QE programme was initially intended to repair financial markets and enhance liquidity 
operations through Large-Scale Asset Purchases (LSAPs) of Mortgage Backed Securities 
(MBS), agency debt, Government Sponsored Enterprises’ (GSE) and treasury securities 
(Labonte, 2014). 
The adoption of QE policy by the Fed to stimulate the US economy did not only lead to a 
flooding of US dollars in the world but also had spill over effects in other nations. This is 
largely due to globalization of financial markets (Rizky, 2015). There is a growing literature 
on the relationship between the Fed’s QE and the performance of financial markets in emerging 
and developing economies (see e.g. Joyce et al., 2011; Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen 
2011; Bhattarai et al., 2015). This paper extends this literature by examining the effects of QE 
on emerging markets, with a case study of South Africa’s listed companies. This is done by 
examining which sectors were adversely affected and which benefited from the different phases 
of QE.  
1.1 Objectives 
The main objective of this study is to examine the response of returns of publicly listed 
companies and their sectors to the announcement of QE policy.  We therefore seek to answer 
the following questions: 
(i) What is the effect of QE policy on sector returns on the JSE? 
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(ii)  What would be an appropriate investment strategy for JSE sectors at a time when 
developed economies are using unconventional monetary policy? 
To motivate our study on whether QE announcements had an impact on stock returns, we do 
an exploratory analysis on whether QE had any impact on the macroeconomy of SA. 
Establishing the nature of the relationship between the macroeconomy and the stock market is 
imperative to investors in understanding the stock market dynamics (Olawale et al., 2014). The 
data used for this analysis should be relevant in quarters during which QE was announced. 
Where possible we do a correlation between indicators from the USA and SA. The indicators 
that we use include GDP, CPI, exchange rate, portfolio investments, bond market yields and 
performance of the stock market indexes. 
To assess how the QE policy affected listed companies and the sectors that benefited the most, 
we create portfolios from different companies in different sectors and observe the trends in 
returns across the companies and sectors. According to, Peersman and Smets (2005) sectors 
will be affected differently by the interest rate channel of monetary policy. They came to this 
conclusion by examining how different sectors were affected by surprises on monetary policy. 
They also found that sectors more dependent on bank funding are more affected by monetary 
policy (Peersman & Smets, 2005). 
To answer our second question, we use the Markowitz mean-variance model to create a 
hypothetical portfolio using some of the indices on the JSE. Using this model, we can determine 
what weights one would allocate to different indices in an optimal portfolio. 
1.2 Motivation and contribution of this research 
South Africa was among the five countries that were listed as the fragile five. The term ‘fragile 
five’ was given to these countries since they were highly dependent on foreign investment to 
finance their growth ambitions. The other countries are Brazil, Indonesia, Turkey and India. 
The performance of the financial sector in these countries appears to have been influenced by 
QE. Several studies have been put forward to explain how QE affected the emerging markets, 
including the fragile five (see Bhattarai et al., 2015; Bowman, Londono & Saprizza, 2014). 
Most studies however, have concentrated on the impact on the macro economy and not the 
listed companies. Rizky (2015) is the exception to these as he examines how QE affected listed 
companies in Indonesia. His focus, however, is on how the listed companies changed their 
financial strategies. Our study looks at the direct effect of QE policy on returns of listed 
companies on the JSE. We are interested in both the sectors that gained and those that lost due 
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to QE policy. We move a step further and provide an alternative investment strategy that could 
be pursued in light of QE.  
In addition, South Africa forms a suitable case study because it has a well-developed financial 
sector and is considered a regional financial hub by investors looking to diversify in Africa. 
South Africa is greatly integrated with the global economy. It has suffered currency volatility 
with a depreciation rate following the withdrawal of QE 3 (Bouraoui, 2015). This provides a 
suitable set up to determine the impact of all QE events on this emerging market’s listed 
companies. 
Finally, our study is among a few others using an event study approach for assessing the effect 
of QE on the performance of stock markets. Empirical works which show how monetary policy 
surprises affect stock markets are often confronted by the problem of endogeneity. This is 
because there is a possibility that stock market developments can cause monetary policy to 
react. However, Kontonikas, MacDonald and Saggu (2013) point out that when dealing with 
daily data within an event study, the endogeneity problem should be of less concern. This is 
because changes in daily asset returns will have less impact on monetary policy. This, in part, 
explains why this thesis adopts an event study approach. 
1.3 Brief background on QE 
Monetary policy refers to actions taken by national central banks to influence the supply of 
money and credit in the economy. This is known as conventional monetary policy. The 
underlying principal objective of any monetary policy is to attain price stability and to anchor 
expectations. Price stability in an economy enables corporations to plan their growth, invest in 
their business and allow the economy to grow at a balanced speed, avoiding an over or 
undersupply of goods and services.  
Monetary policy is implemented using several conventional tools such as interest rates, open 
market operations and reserve ratios. However, with the cut in interest rates to near zero for 
most developed economies, unconventional monetary instruments have become popular. One 
such tool put in place to tackle the impact of the GFC on the US financial markets is QE.  QE 
is when the central bank purchases other types of financial assets from the market, for example, 
long-term government bonds or MBS, with the aim of increasing the number of liquid assets 
in the monetary base and lowering interest rates (VoxEU.org, 2016). It is used when 
conventional monetary policies do not work.  During the period following the financial crisis, 
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the federal funds rate (FFR) were at zero percent and this implied it was not possible to reduce 
the FFR further (Gertler & Karadi, 2013). 
The aim of QE is to stimulate the economic growth of a country. This can be done by 
purchasing assets or borrowing programs that will lead to an increase in the monetary base. 
Any programs aimed at improving credit conditions through increasing the monetary base can 
be referred to as part of QE policy (Fawley & Neely, 2013).  
The first-time QE was done was in the 1930s. In April 1932, the Fed conducted large-scale 
open market operations but this lasted only until July 1932. Another difference to the recent 
experience was that the fed rate had not reached the zero-lower bound limit and most short-
term rates were above 2% (Bordo, 2014). The Bank of Japan (BoJ) was the first to coin this 
type of monetary policy as quantitative easing in the early 2000s. The primary goal of the 
policy was to stimulate the economy while stimulating bank lending to fight deflation. QE’s 
transmission channel in Japan included an asset supply channel and a monetary base channel 
(Voutsinas & Werner, 2011). One year later after QE had begun, BoJ staff Kimura et al., (2002) 
and Shirakwa (2002) found that QE was not effective and argued that no form of monetary 
policy was bound to be effective under zero interest rates. Following the financial crisis, the 
Bank of England (BoE), European Central Bank (ECB) and the Fed adopted QE. The Fed and 
the BoE concentrated in bond purchases while the BoJ and ECB focused on lending directly to 
banks. 
If QE did not work in Japan, why would the US adopt the same policy? The difference in the 
definition of QE between the two banks may be a reason. In Japan, QE was defined as the 
ability of central banks to provide abundant funds (Okina &Shiratsuka, 2004). Their work 
analyses yield curves, spot and forward rates in which they assume that if monetary policy can 
successfully influence short and long-term interest rates, then it is effective. Their findings 
indicate that since long term yields remained low, QE could not dissipate deflationary 
expectations. On the other hand, Bernanke, Reinhart and Sack (2004) define QE as increasing 
the central bank’s balance sheet. Their work measured effectiveness of the policy by its success 
in bringing down long-term interest rates. They found positive results for the US but negative 
results for Japan.  
Our study concentrates on the QE done by the Fed since 2008. The first round of QE began in 
December 2008 and lasted until March 2010. The goal was to lower interest rates and to 
improve liquidity. To achieve this goal, the Fed purchased MBS worth US $1.25 trillion, US 
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$175 billion in federal agency debt and US $300 billion of long-term treasury securities 
(Ricketts, 2011). 
To strengthen economic recovery, QE2 began in November 2010 and up until the second 
quarter of 2011. The Fed hoped to lower interest rates by purchasing US $600 billion of long-
term treasury securities (Ricketts, 2011). Lowering interest rates was intended to spur 
consumer spending and business investments. QE2 did not fully meet its expectation for 
achieving the monetary policy goals. Therefore, operation twist was initiated in September 
2011. Its goal was to lengthen the maturity of Fed’s treasury securities portfolio by buying 
long-term securities and selling an equal amount of short-term securities (Rosengren, 2015).  
To support stronger economic activity, QE3 came into effect in September 2012 when the Fed 
increased open market operations by a further US $40 billion, taking the total to US $85 billion 
in bond purchasing per month. The end of QE3 was tied to an improvement in labour markets 
and achieving an inflation rate that was consistent with the Federal Open Market Committee’s 
(FOMC) dual mandate (Labonte, 2014). Figure 1 shows the growth of the Fed’s balance sheet 
by key dates while Table 1 presents the date and nature of the policy announcements. 
Figure 1: Federal Reserve Assets by key dates 
 
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Credit and liquidity programs and balance sheet: 








Table 1: Dates and nature of the policy announcements 
Date Announcement 
December 2007 to 
November 2008 
The Fed created emergency liquid facilities to deal with the financial 
crisis 
November 25, 2008 Fed begins buying agency debt and MBS 
December 16, 2008 Reduced Federal funds rate to a range of 0% to 0.25% 
March 18, 2009 Large-scale asset purchases 
August 10,2010 Maturing assets from the asset purchases are replaced with treasury 
securities 
August 27, 2010 Ben Bernanke’s speech hints that there will be more purchases by the 
Fed 
November 3, 2010 QE2 begins- the Fed begins to buy treasury securities worth $600 
billion for a period of eight months 
August 9, 2011 Target date to keep federal funds rate exceptionally low set to mid-2-
13. It was later moved to mid-2015 
September 21, 2011 Operation Twist 
January 25, 2012 Inflation goal is set at 2% 
June 20,2012 Extended Operation Twist 
August 22, 2012 Minutes from FOMC suggested a likelihood for another round of 
monetary stimulus 
September 13, 2012 QE3 begins 
December 12, 2013 Fed announces it will continue to purchase $45 billion of treasury 
securities per month 
December 18, 2013 Fed announces they will begin to ‘taper off’ 
Source: Labonte, 2014:2 
 
In a hypothetical world of perfect financial markets, the purchases done by the Fed would have 
had no effect on asset prices. This is because the price of an asset depends on expected future 
returns adjusted for risk. When inflation is very low and the Fed cannot reduce the funds rate 
anymore, unconventional monetary policies are used. For QE to affect long-term interest rates, 
forward guidance should be in place. This way, expectations for the future path for monetary 
policy are created.  
QE affects the economy through various transmission channels. Figure 2 shows the 
transmission channels of QE. The most direct channel is the changes in long-term interest rates. 
Purchasing treasury securities in large scale by the Fed resulted in high demand for these assets, 
which in turn raised their prices. As the prices increased, interest rates fell and the cost of 
financing new capital investments to businesses decreased. For example, to boost the economy, 
the Fed will lower the FFR and this causes other interest rates to decline. This will boost the 
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value of the stock market and allow businesses and households to spend more creating more 
demand for goods and services. 
 
Figure 2: Hypothetical transmission channels of QE 
 
Source: Ncube & Hausken (2013:6) 
 
Below is a brief discussion of the various channels: 
a. Money 
In the long-run, this channel is expected to affect the economy through inflation and 
spending. Purchasing of assets by the central bank is expected to increase broad money 
holdings. This should raise asset prices and lower borrowing costs, thus stimulating 
expenditure and increasing wealth. 
Central bank asset purchases cause the banking sector to gain new reserves at the central 
bank. This level of new liquid assets should encourage banks to lend more to customers.  
b. Policy signalling 
The information that accompanied announcements of the asset purchases provided 
market participants with the likely path of future monetary policies. 
c. Portfolio rebalancing 
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The portfolio-rebalancing channel implies a change in investor’s portfolio composition. 
QE involved buying long-term securities from investors like pension funds and 
insurance companies. To an investor, different classes of financial assets are not perfect 
substitutes. This was the key premise to the portfolio-rebalancing channel and is based 
on ideas from monetary economists such as James Tobin, Milton Freidman, Franco 
Modigliani, Karl Brunner and Allan Meltzer (Bernanke, 2012). Therefore, it is expected 
that investors would go for other, riskier assets such as corporate bonds or shares and 
this would push their prices up.  
This happens in three additional ways 
(i) Liquidity premium – this is the compensation investors should get for assuming 
the risk of potentially having to liquidate their long positions at disadvantageous 
prices. 
(ii) Risk premium – this is the difference between the risk-free rate and the return 
expected return on risky assets  
(iii)Flight to safety – in periods of market stress, investors risk aversion increases. 
This causes them to change their portfolio composition in search of higher risk 
premiums. This in turn drives down the prices of risky assets. 
The above additional ways change the affect an investors choice of assets in portfolio 
composition. 
d. Market liquidity  
By purchasing long-term securities, liquidity available to investors is increased. This 
increased liquidity lowers the premium for illiquidity which means the function of the 
markets will improve and this will lead to an increase in asset prices. 
e. Confidence 
If the monetary policy leads to a positive economic outlook, this can boost consumer 
confidence and thus, the willingness of consumers to spend. This is expected to be 
reflected in higher asset prices.  
 
1.4 Limitations of the study 
Since we are using an event study for our empirical analysis, this means we are not able to 
capture any persistent effects. Testing for these effects would require a more specified 
econometric analysis depending on the data being used. Financial variables usually have a low 
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fit when it comes to fully specified econometric analysis. This would be outside the scope of 
our analysis. 
1.5  Thesis organisation 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Chapter two presents the theory that relates 
monetary policy to stock prices. 
 Chapter three reviews the empirical findings of the impact of QE in the US, United Kingdom 
(UK), Japan, Euro area and the emerging markets. This chapter also presents empirical 
evidence on how monetary policy affects the stock market. 
Chapter four presents the data, data sources and descriptive statistics. 
Chapter five discusses the methodology used.  
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2. Theoretical Overview of Monetary Policy 
This chapter discusses the relationship between monetary policy and stock markets when 
conventional monetary policy is used. 
Monetary policy is mostly expressed in terms of macro-economic variables such as inflation, 
employment and output. Interestingly, the impact of these variables is indirect. However, direct 
impact of monetary policy actions will be on the financial markets. There are two channels in 
which stock prices will be affected by monetary policy. Firstly, the interest rates channel. 
Interest rates influence economic activity through consumption and investment by directly 
affecting the demand for loans. Higher interest rates mean the cost of borrowing is high and 
therefore companies invest less and therefore lower economic activity. In addition, high cost 
of borrowing implies higher cost of capital for firms and therefore the present value of the 
company’s future cash flows will decline, causing a negative impact on the stock price.  
One of the methods of valuing a company is by calculating the present value of its discounted 
cash flows. Using this method, one can deduce important information on stock market effects 
on monetary policy changes. This method, as explained by Kontonikas and lIoannidis (2008), 
shows that the intrinsic stock price Pt is valued as the expected value of future expected 
dividends Dt+j of the company and terminal stock price at the last period. Assuming a constant 
discounting rate, the discounted cash flow method can be shown as follows: 
Equation 1: Discounted Cash Flow – constant discount rate 











 𝑃𝑡+𝑁]   (1)                      
    
where: Et is the conditional expectation operator, based on the information available up to time 
t, N is the number of investor’s holding period, Rt is the rate of return to discount the future 
values. 
As the stock holding periods N increases to infinity, the second term on the right-hand 
decreases to zero. 
Equation 2: Holding a stock for long periods 







𝑃𝑡+𝑁] = 0     (2)
     
The discount cash flow method can therefore be defined as follows: 
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Equation 3: Discounted cashflow 







𝑗=1 ]      (3)
    
The theory shows that the intrinsic price of a stock is determined by future cash flows and the 
discounting rate. Smirlock and Yawitz (1985) point out that a reduction in the company’s stock 
price can be caused by an increase in the FFR because: (i) the discount rate Rt will rise and (ii) 
the expectations of future net cash flows will decrease to the degree that a decrease in monetary 
policy associated with a rise in the FFR will hamper real economic activity. Monetary policy 
can therefore affect stock price through the discounting rate that is linked to the interest rate 
and the future cash flows. An expansionary monetary policy will cause an increase in stock 
returns and this can be seen through increasing future cash flows or decreasing discount factors 
(Smirlock & Yawitz, 1985). 
The second way monetary policy affects the stock market is through the availability of credit. 
This can be divided into the bank loan channel and the balance sheet channel. These channels 
affect the external finance premium. The bank loan channel focuses on the availability of loans. 
If there is a tightening of the monetary policy, then there is less credit available and economic 
activity slows down. The balance sheet channel focuses on the changes in the credit worthiness 
of firms’ due to the quality of their balance sheets. A monetary tightening as measured by the 
balance sheet channel will cause a reduction in the revenues of firm and increase the floating 
rate interest payments. This will cause the net cashflows to reduce. (Kontonikas & Kostakis 
2013). Higher stock prices will improve the financial position of firms and this will allow them 
to borrow more cheaply and easily. 
The relationship between the stock market and monetary policy can either be reactive or 
proactive. The reactive view argues that monetary authorities should not alter interest rates in 
a manner to influence stock markets and avoid bubbles but they should wait and see if there 
are stock price reversals. A reactive approach implies that stock price change can only be 
inferred from actual results and not forecasts (Bernanke & Gertler, 2001). On the other hand, 
the proactive view proposes that to reduce macroeconomic volatility, policymakers should 
change interest rates in response to developing market bubbles (Kontonikas & Ionnidis, 2005). 
The actions of the central bank on interest rates will affect company performance in three ways:  
(1) Higher interest rates could make it difficult to expand; 
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(2) Cost of capital can go higher due to fluctuations in the exchange rate which makes the 
central bank to intervene in the currency market. This intervention can cause volatility in the 
stock markets; 
(3)  Unstable inflation will affect consumers’ and suppliers’ purchasing power (Rizky, 2015).  
It is important for central banks and investors to be aware and understand the relationship 
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3. Literature Review 
In this section, we look at the impact of QE in select advanced economies and emerging 
markets. The aim of this section is to review and critique the work that has been done on the 
impact of QE following several strands of literature. This is necessary to be able to establish 
the context of our study and the contribution to this growing literature. 
3.1 Review of Impact of QE in the US 
QE was aimed at improving economic activity by reducing long-term interest rates. There is 
empirical evidence to show that QE did in fact lower long-term interest rates (see e.g. Gagnon 
et al., 2011; Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen 2011; D’Amico et al., 2012).  Long-term 
interest rates can be decomposed into two components. The first component is the expectations 
component that is equal to the term premium component and the second component is the 
average of expected future short-term interest rates. There are studies that concentrate on the 
impact of QE1 on long term interest rates. The first of these studies was by Gagnon et al., 
(2010) where they combined both time series and event study methodologies to gauge the 
impact of the LSAPs program. The financial variables used included 2-year and 10-year 
treasury bond yields, 10-year agency debt yield, the current coupon 30-year agency MBS yield, 
the 10-year treasury term premium, the ten-year swap rate and the BAA grade corporate bond 
index yield (Gagnon et al., 2011). The event study had eight episodes where the Federal 
Reserve made announcements for purchasing of MBS, agency debt or treasury securities. 
Their study considered how interest rates responded to QE announcements using a one-day 
window. Their findings show that all interest rates declined. The 10-year treasury yield 
declined by 91 basis points, the 10-year agency debt yield declined by 156 basis points and the 
current coupon agency MBS yield declined by 113 basis points (Gagnon et al., 2011). In 
addition, they went a step further to change the parameters of the event study. Firstly, they 
include all the FOMC statements and minutes between November 2008 and January 2010 to 
allow for market expectations from the communications of the LSAPs programs. Secondly, 
using the same event dates, they use an expanded event window of two days to allow for lagged 
reactions to the news by market participants. Their results show that, using the expanded event 
set, the cumulative declines were between 10 basis points larger and 30 basis points smaller 
than with the baseline set. Using the two-day response window, the cumulative declines were 
between 0 to 40 basis points larger than with the one-day window (Gagnon et al., 2010). 
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Just like Gagnon et al., (2010), Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) did an event 
study but focused on the first five event dates that Gagnon et al. used. These dates are 
November 25, December 1, December 16, 2008 and January 28 and March 18, 2009. They did 
not include the other days because the changes in yields were small. The data they used include 
federal funds futures contracts, the Credit Default Swaps (CDS) swap rates, inflation swap rates 
and the implied volatility on interest rate options (Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011). 
A two-day window was used to present changes for all assets.  
In general, long-term bond yields reduced during all the event dates. As discussed earlier, QE 
affects the economy through various channels. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) 
present their results by assessing the following channels: signalling channel, duration risk 
channel, inflation channel, prepayment risk channel, safety channel and liquidity channel. They 
argue that the duration risk premium only predicts effects that depend on bond maturity and 
therefore not substantial. Using QE1 dates, the signalling channel accounts for declines 
equivalent to almost 40 basis points. The largest effect is a fall in the 10-year agency yields by 
200 basis points. Gagnon et al., (2010) also found the largest effect to be on the 10-year agency 
yields.  
The safety channel effects are mostly accounted for using the agency and treasury yields. The 
prepayment risk channel accounts for a decline in agency MBS yields by 107 basis points for 
30-year bonds and 88 basis points for 15-year bonds (Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen, 
2011). Lower grade corporate bonds are affected by the default risk premium. From their 
results, CDS rates on triple A (AAA) rated firms did not change appreciably with QE. However, 
largest falls in CDS rates were recorded in firms with higher credit risk. The inflation channel 
shows that the impact on expected inflation of the asset purchases by the Fed was large and 
positive. In addition, by evaluating the inflation uncertainty channel, they find that QE1 
reduced inflation uncertainty.  
 To supplement studies done on QE1, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) add 
evidence from QE2 also by doing an event study. The event dates used here were August 10 
and September 21, 2010. The data used include treasury yields, corporate bond yields, CDS 
rates, CDS –adjusted corporate yields, agency and agency MBS yields over the event dates. 
QE2 had a small effect on yields compared to the effects on QE1. This makes it difficult to 
determine which channels QE2 worked through. Through the signalling channel, 5-year bonds 
were lowered by 11 basis points while10-year bonds were lowered by seven basis points. Using 
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the safety channel, yields on low-default-risk 10-year bonds were lowered by six basis points. 
They also found evidence of an increase in inflation expectations. However, no evidence is 
found on the prepayment risk channel and this is because QE2 did not involve MBS purchases. 
There is also no evidence on the liquidity channel and credit risk channel. 
Adding to the literature on which transmission channels QE affects long term-interest rates, 
D’Amico et al., (2012) identified three channels, namely, scarcity channel, duration channel 
and signalling channel. Their paper also seeks to clarify the role of LSAPs on monetary policy 
strategy. The scarcity channel is associated with the preferred habitat theory and is defined as 
“a mechanism under which the purchase by the Federal Reserve of assets with specific maturity 
leads to higher prices (and lower yields) of securities with similar maturities” (D’Amico et al., 
2012:2). This channel is identified through looking at the maturity of different treasury 
securities relative to total treasury debt. The duration channel is defined as “a mechanism under 
which the removal, by means of the Federal Reserve purchases, of aggregate duration from 
outstanding stock of treasury debt reduces term premiums on securities across maturities” 
(D’Amico et al., 2012:2). This channel is closely associated to the portfolio rebalance channel. 
The signalling channel was felt through the expectations of the market on the short-term policy 
rate.  
The data used in their study is security-specific in that they use the identification number on 
the issued treasury security. They also use the amount held in the Federal Reserve’s System 
Open Market Account portfolio and the cumulative amount of any treasury buyback. Both 
results from the scarcity and duration channels are statistically significant. Taking scarcity and 
duration channels together, QE1 reduced longer-term yields by around 35 basis points. The 
second LSAP program however, had a smaller impact on duration despite being larger in dollar 
amount. The long-term treasury yields were reduced by 45 basis points. However, there was 
no evidence to ascertain the signalling channel (D’Amico et al., 2012). 
Some of the studies have focused on the impact of QE on the macro economy. However, there 
have been criticisms as to whether the LSAPs program would have any effect on the real 
economy. This is based on New Keynesian model. Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) argue that 
if arbitrage opportunities were available to market participants, the asset purchases would have 
no effect on real economic outcomes. To extend this criticism, Curdia and Woodford (2011) 
argue that if households perceive that assets purchased are equivalent to reserves, then the 
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LSAPs program would have no effect on the macro economy. Such criticisms have extended 
to difficulty in empirically evaluating the impact of QE on the macro economy.  
 The data required to do such an evaluation would include real GDP per capita, hours worked, 
real wages, core personal consumption expenditures deflator, nominal effective Federal funds 
rate and the 10-year treasury constant maturity yield (Chen et al.,2012). Using the data 
mentioned above, Chen et al. (2012) concentrate on QE2 to assess the effects of asset purchase 
programs on variables such as GDP growth and inflation. They estimate a dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium (DSGE) model with segmented markets. This model allows them to 
evaluate the extent of criticisms mentioned above. 
Their results indicate that the effects of GDP growth and inflation are almost negligible but the 
impact on GDP level is long-run. Their results are consistent with other work from Chung et 
al., (2011) who find that QE2 caused a reduction in the risk premium of only 20 basis points 
but increased the level of GDP by around 0.6% and the inflation rate by 0.1%. Different to 
using the DSGE model, Baumeister and Benati (2011) use a Vector Auto Regression model 
(VAR) with time-varying coefficients and their results indicate a change in the term premium 
of 60 basis points, increase in GDP growth of 3% and inflation by 1%. Chen et al., (2012) 
conclude that the quantitative relevance of the asset programs appears to be limited. Weale and 
Wieladek (2014) also use structural VAR and include asset purchases announcement. They 
find that QE1 increased GDP by 0.7% in the USA and 2.5% in the UK; inflation increased by 
0.8% in the USA and 4.2% in the UK.  
Wu and Xia (2016) use statistical model to compute a shadow rate from forward rates and 
treasuries that applies when the rates are reserved at the zero-lower bound. They also find that 
the macroeconomic effects of QE using this shadow rate are small. The unconventional 
monetary policy during 2009 – 2013 only reduced employment by 1% by December 2013. 
Yu (2016) finds that the maturity extension programme carried out on QE had some effect on 
firm behaviour. His findings indicate that firms that were more dependent on long-term debt 
issued more long-term debt following operation twist to fund more capital investment. 
The last strand of literature has focused on the portfolio balance channel. For this channel to 
work, long-term debt in the financial market should clearly be identified. Most of the funds the 
central bank borrowed were from either insurance companies or pension funds. So, if the 
portfolio channel was to work, the greatest effect would have been seen from investors in these 
companies. However, most work done on the portfolio rebalance channel has been on how it 
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affected the behaviour of government bond prices and other asset prices but not on how 
investors behaved.  
Not much has been done empirically to examine the validity of the portfolio balancing channel 
away from the zero-lower bound. Therefore, from this literature, it would be hard to analyse 
whether any imperfections in balance sheet dynamics and financial channels are mirrored.  
Igan, Simone and Tamirisa (2016) evaluate how the balance sheet channel works as a 
mechanism to transmit monetary policy in the US. They use data from financial intermediaries, 
households and non-financial firms. These data helped them to evaluate how balance sheets 
are affected by interest rate changes and if there is a role played by financial frictions channels 
in transmitting monetary policy to the broader economy. Using a Factor-Augmented Vector 
Regression to look at the effects of 100 basis points increase in federal funds rate, their results 
show that house prices, residential investment and the balance sheets of mortgage lenders are 
affected minimally. 
Monetary policy shocks will have an impact on how the portfolio balance sheet channel works. 
In evaluating how the portfolio balance sheet channel affects the balance sheet of households, 
Beckworth and Hendrickson (2014) find that monetary policy shocks cause a rebalancing of 
portfolios which is consistent with the transmission mechanism outlined by the channel. A 
monetary policy shock due to monetary easing will cause a shift in portfolio composition out 
of equities and into bonds and this represents a negative conditional correlation between flows 
in equities and bonds and the benefits of diversification. 
Carpenter et al., (2015) assess how portfolios belonging to investors that sold securities to the 
Fed changed after the sales. They use these investors and divide them into eight different 
categories. These categories include rest of the world, depository institutions, insurance 
companies, investment funds, pension and retirement funds, state and local governments, 
broker-dealers and households (Carpenter et al., 2015). The data they used begin from 1991: 
Q1 and ends in 2012: Q3.  
Their results suggest that sales to the Fed by the investors was not uniform. The largest seller 
of treasury securities to the Fed were hedge funds, broker-dealers and insurance companies. 
Households, investment companies, and to a lesser extent, pension funds are the largest seller 
of MBS when the Fed buys (Carpenter et al., 2015). Selling to the Fed prompted households 
to shift their portfolios toward corporate bonds, commercial paper and municipal loans and 
debt. Additionally, sales of MBS to the Federal Reserve by pension funds caused households 
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to shift their portfolios towards short-term assets (Carpenter et al., 2015). They also find 
evidence to support purchase of other assets by investors putting downward pressure on market 
rates. 
Montecino and Eipsten (2015) use household data from the Federal Reserve’s Survey of 
Consumer Finances to identify the key channels of the impact of QE on income distribution. 
They find that due to the large impact on equity prices increase, inequality also increased. 
However, QE had small impact on reducing inequality through employment generation and 
mortgage refinancing.  
 Montecino and Eipsten (2015) go a step further to investigate how the financial market reacts 
to QE announcements. They perform event-style regressions using daily stock return data 
obtained from Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) in which they are able to assess 
whether a portfolio attained abnormal returns following a market event. They assess which 
business sectors lost or gained due to QE announcements. Their findings indicate that for QE1, 
investors’ expectations were widely distributed; large financial firms benefited as did other key 
business sectors like autos, energy and construction. For QE2 most firms were expected to 
benefit while in QE3, only a few firms were expected to benefit. 
3.2 Review of impact of QE in UK 
QE in the UK was also expected to work through the portfolio-rebalancing channel. Not much 
work has been done to find the impact of QE in the UK compared to the USA.  Studies done 
on the impact of QE on financial markets are in consensus that QE reduced bond yields. The 
impact on the real economy however, is not clear. 
One of the earliest studies on the impact of QE in the UK was by Joyce et al., (2011). They 
investigate the impact of QE on financial markets. They find that the asset purchases of £200 
billion in QE1 may have depressed medium to long-term yields by 100 basis points and the 
largest impact came through the portfolio balance approach. However, they find that the impact 
on other assets is affected by other influences. 
Breedon, Chadha and Waters (2012) measure the impact of the initial QE programme (2009-
2010) on bonds and other assets. They construct a counterfactual yield curve that is able to 
represent the QE period using actual estimates from the government liability curve. They find 
that the portfolio-rebalancing channel worked to lower bond yields by around 50 basis points. 
They use an event study to assess how market liquidity as impacted. They find that there is a 
significant price difference in bond prices on the day of the QE operation. However, on the 
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equity market, results suggest that there was little QE effect. This could be ascribed to the fact 
that since equities have long duration the reduction in duration risk from QE did not flow 
through to equities. They conclude that QEs impact on market liquidity was mostly in the bond 
market.  
Bridges and Thomas (2012) believe that if QE had not been undertaken between March 2009 
and January 2010, the level of inflation would have fallen to negative and real GDP would have 
fallen to levels lower than those reached in 2009. They use a monetarist framework to find the 
impact of QE in the UK. This kind of approach focuses on the macroeconomic effects of the 
supply of money from the central bank. To estimate the impact of QE, they create a framework 
that considers the supply and demand for money. This approach shows how the portfolio 
rebalancing channel induced QE and the subsequent impact on the broader economy. In other 
studies, the role of asset quantities and the money supply in QE transmission is in the 
background. Bridges and Thomas (2012) also consider how the sectoral pattern of money 
holdings and spending evolves as QE unfolds.   
These researchers find that QE boosted broad money supply by £122 billion (8%). This 
estimate is then applied to the models and shows that such an increase could have pushed down 
yields by around 150 basis points in 2012 and increased asset values by 20% (Bridges 
&Thomas, 2012).  This then stimulated demand and there was a positive effect on the level of 
GDP of around 1.5% and on inflation of 1.25 percentage points. They do however, caution that 
their results are subject to uncertainty.  
Most studies done on the portfolio-rebalancing channel have inferred its importance from the 
behaviour of government bond yields but not from direct evidence on the investors behaviour.  
Joyce, Liu and Tonks (2014) try to fill this gap by evaluating how QE affected the investment 
behaviour of insurance companies and pension funds. This is the group of investors that the 
BoE purchased government bonds from. They ask the question, would the investment 
behaviour of these investors change if QE policy was not in place?  If QE worked through this 
channel, did these investors reduce the holdings of UK government bonds and increase their 
holdings to riskier assets like equities? To answer this question, it is important to consider other 
factors that could have been present in driving portfolio allocation. Joyce, Liu and Tonks 
(2014) consider factors that cannot be affected by bank’s purchases but influence portfolio 
allocation. These factors are gilt issuance by the Debt Management Office and foreign financial 
variables (Joyce, Liu and Tonks, 2014). 
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Their results indicate that QE led institutional investors to reinvest their proceeds from gilt 
holdings into corporate bonds. In addition, during the period of QE purchases the investors sold 
equities limiting portfolio reallocation to corporate bonds.  
3.3 Review of Impact of QE in Japan 
 Despite evidence of the success of QE in UK and US, the story in Japan has been different. 
There has been consensus by analysts that QE failed in stimulating aggregate demand 
sufficiently to overcome deflation. It is possible that QE provided little stimulus but these 
positive effects could have been outweighed by contractionary forces in Japan’s post-bubble 
economy (Bowman, Londono & Sapriza, 2015).  
Studies on the impact of QE in Japan have attempted to assess the channels through which QE 
has worked. These channels include the impact on the current account balance, expectations of 
market participants and increased central bank purchases of long-term Japanese government 
bonds (JBG) that would reduce long-term interest rates. To extract the effects of QE, most of 
the studies done have used JGB yields or yen-swap interest rates to decompose the yield curve.  
The BOJ made a commitment to keep the policy rate at zero if the economy was experiencing 
deflation. Oda and Ueda (2005) use a macro-finance, no arbitrage model of the term structure 
to model a counter-factual to estimate the effects of this commitment. The use of the macro-
finance approach enabled them to use financial and macroeconomic data to be able to 
effectively analyse how long-term interest rates are affected by monetary policy and the 
economic structure. 
To find the impact of QE through the current account balance channel, Oda and Ueda (2005) 
find the increase in the current account to be small but statistically significant. By keeping the 
interest rates at zero percent, the short and medium-term maturities were lowered. This shows 
the expectations component of the yield curve was achieved. However, the commitment did 
not lower the risk premium component.  Their finding indicates that purchasing long-term 
government bonds did not lead to a portfolio rebalancing. Their results also suggest that by 
raising the reserve target the market interpreted this as a positive signal on the willingness of 
BOJ to continue with QE. 
Market perceptions on the stance the central bank takes on monetary policy are very important. 
This is another channel where the real effects of QE could have been felt. Kobayashi, Spiegel 
and Yamoshi (2006) examine the insights of the market regarding the BOJ supporting the 
banking sector. The period under study is March 2001 to end of 2004 where they identify 10 
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dates related to announcements regarding changes in the QE policy (Kobayashi, Spiegel & 
Yamoshi, 2006). 
It is assumed that Japanese industries and firms dependent on troubled banks were expected to 
benefit from QE. Kobayashi, Spiegel and Yamoshi (2006) find evidence to support this notion. 
They also find that when QE policies were aimed at flattening the yield curve, statistically 
significant positive returns were reported in the banking system. Policies aimed at flattening 
the yield curve include the increases in purchases of JGBs (Kobayashi, Spiegel & Yamoshi, 
2006). However, there were no abnormal returns on Japanese stock equities since increases in 
the current account were not because of increases in the bond purchases.  
QE could have lowered expected future interest rates and nominal longer-term rates while 
increasing expected inflation. Findings from Baba et al., (2005) suggest that the introduction 
of the QE policy caused a reduction in the variance of deposit rates across banks, more than 
the decline expected in the variance of bank credit ratings. 
QE could have operated through the credit channel which means increasing the liquidity of 
banks so that they are able to provide more loans to borrowers. Ugai (2007) finds mixed results 
on the impact of QE in Japan. He finds evidence that suggests that through the signalling 
channel of QE interest rates were expected to remain but finds that bond yields were not directly 
impacted by QE. However, Bernanke, Reinhart & Sack (2004) find that Japanese yields were 
roughly 50 basis points lower than expected during the QE period. 
3.4 Review of Impact of QE on the Euro area 
The impact of QE in Europe has also been quite different mostly due to the difference in the 
structure of its financial system.  Researchers have argued that QE is expected to have little 
direct effect on the economy. This is because at the announcement of QE, January 2015, the 
financial conditions in Europe were stable and yields and spreads were already compressed. 
These factors limit the effectiveness of QE. There have also been concerns regarding how QE 
will influence the markets. For example, there would be insufficient liquidity in the market for 
the programme to have any effect. Side effects would increase risk to financial stability or 
worsen income inequality. Another concern was that the risk sharing arrangements could exert 
pressures on the euro area solidarity if a member state declared bankruptcy. However, none of 
these concerns has materialised.  
The same channels of transmission are expected to work in the euro area. These are portfolio-
rebalancing channel, signalling channel and bank lending channel. Most studies have focused 
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on the channels where QE is expected to work and what lessons can be learned from the USA 
and UK. In general, QE in the euro zone has had a much smaller effect on bond yields for the 
core member states and greater impact on the periphery states. 
Altavilla, Carboni & Motto (2015) evaluate the effects on the asset prices of the ECB purchase 
programme. Even though the programme was announced at a time when financial conditions 
were stable, the purchases had significant effects on asset prices. Their findings suggest that 
the ECB programme was able to reduce the 10-year long-term yields by around 30-50 basis 
points and roughly twice as much for countries such as Italy and Spain. For the 20-year yields, 
the German yields reduced by 30 basis points while in Spain they reduced by 80 basis points. 
The authors show that the reason why QE worked, despite stable financial conditions, is that 
assets which were targeted by the ECB were the ones with long maturity, causing a change in 
the investment grade space. This supports the duration and credit channels. In addition, there 
were spill-overs in non-targeted assets. For instance, the authors find that there is a decline by 
about 20 basis points in the spread between the risk-free rate and the non-targeted bonds for 
the corporations in the euro area. 
3.5 Brief Review of Impact of QE in Emerging markets 
The increase in globalisation means that the changes in monetary policy of the developed 
economies will have an impact globally. In theory, the main source of influence the US 
monetary policy has on emerging markets is through emerging market debt. An increase in the 
US federal funds rate will cause an increase in the domestic interest rates of emerging markets 
and therefore increase debt-service costs. The IMF (2013) suggested that the unconventional 
monetary policy measures would have financial spill overs when the policies change the 
monetary framework. The impact to other countries depends on the stability of the country’s 
financial system. 
The transmission channels of QE to emerging markets are the portfolio balance channel, 
signalling channel, exchange rate channel and trade-flow channel. Purchasing the longer 
duration assets compresses the term premium in these assets leading to an increase in demand 
for substitute assets. Emerging market assets fall under substitute assets. These substitute assets 
will have higher risk adjusted returns. As investors move to these riskier assets their risk 
premiums will be lowered boosting the prices for assets.  For emerging markets, an increase in 
price will cause a decrease in yields leading to an easing in financial conditions in the economy. 
In addition, if future policy rates were kept lower than previously expected, there would be 
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larger interest rate differentials with respect to EMEs, which could prompt carry trades and 
capital flows to EMEs.  Portfolio flows could result in a depreciation of the US dollar, which 
in turn could compress the demand for foreign-produced goods and services, and this would 
affect emerging market exports negatively (Lavigne, Sarker & Vasistha, 2014).  
Most of the literature done on emerging markets has focused on the impact of QE on capital 
flows, exchange rates, long-term bond yields and the stock market. Hausman and Wongswan 
(2011) analyse the impact of the US monetary policy announcement surprises on foreign equity 
indexes, short-and-long-term interest rates and exchange rates in 49 countries (Hausman & 
Wongswan, 2011). For the monetary policy surprise two proxies are used.  These are: a target 
surprise which is the surprise change to the current target federal funds rate and a path surprise 
which is the revision to the expected path of future monetary policy (Hausman & Wongswan, 
2011). 
Hausman and Wongswan (2011) results indicate that asset classes respond differently to 
monetary policy surprise mechanism.  For example, global equity indexes respond mainly to 
target surprise; exchange rates and long-term interest rates respond to the path surprise while 
short-term interest rates respond to both surprises. They also find that asset price responses to 
FOMC announcements are related to a country’s exchange rate regime. If a country has a more 
flexible exchange rate regime, equity indexes and interest rates do not respond significantly to 
US monetary surprises (Hausman & Wongswan, 2011). 
In their paper, on the International Spill overs of US Quantitative Easing, Fratzscher, Lo Duca 
and Straub (2016) analyse the effects of the Federal Reserve’s unconventional policies on the 
US and several foreign financial markets. They investigated the effects of QE1 and QE2 on 
global asset prices and capital flows using data from daily portfolio flows into bonds and equity 
mutual funds taken from the perspective of a US investor. 
Their findings indicated that the changes in the US monetary policy led to a portfolio re-
allocation and global financial markets experienced a re-pricing. They find that QE1 improved 
both US equity and bond prices and led to US dollar appreciation. On the contrary, QE2 led to 
a US dollar depreciation and the improvement in global equity prices. A portfolio rebalancing 
occurred in QE1 with target being riskier markets in US equity. However, QE2 and QE3 saw 
inflows into emerging markets (Fratzscher, Lo Duca & Straub, 2016).   
In another study, Burns et al., (2014) examine the implication of QE for emerging market 
capital flows and crisis risks. They point out the effects that the expansionary policy has had 
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on markets beyond the U.S, These include a slowdown of capital inflows in developing 
countries; weaker portfolio investments in other markets outside of developing economies; 
higher risks of abrupt adjustments; abrupt changes in market expectations (increasing global 
bond yields); substantial expansion of domestic credit balances; deteriorating current balances; 
higher levels of foreign and short term debt and overvalued exchange rate. 
They point out that the effects of monetary retrenchment within the US will have the greatest 
effect on frontier and emerging markets. This is because these countries may be forced to raise 
interest rates to curb rising inflation, currency depreciation and weak economic growth as 
capital flows take flight. The negative effects of rising international interest rates should be 
countered by a tighter fiscal and monetary policy (Burns et al.,2014). 
Similar to the literature done on advanced economies on the impact of QE on financial markets, 
Bowman, Londono and Sapriza (2014) analyse the effects of QE on emerging market 
economies sovereign yields, foreign exchange rates and stock prices. They also analyse how 
these effects depend on country-specific characteristics. The data they used includes sovereign 
bond yields, exchange rates and headline stock indexes (Bowman, Londono & Sapriza, 2014). 
The country-specific variables assessed are interest rates, CDS spreads, inflation rates, current 
account deficits and the banking system (Bowman, Londono & Sapriza, 2014). 
They find that prices of sovereign bonds respond strongly to unconventional monetary policy 
announcements by the Fed. They find that the shock that lower US sovereign yields also lowers 
yields in EMEs. In their country-specific analysis, they find that those countries with high 
interest rates, inflation rates, CDS spreads, current account deficits and a vulnerable banking 
system are more prone to changes in the US financial variables. Finally, they conclude that 
deteriorating financial or macroeconomic conditions in an EME could cause unexpected and 
unwelcome effects on asset prices due to unconventional monetary policies (Bowman, 
Londono & Sapriza, 2014). 
Aizenman, Binici and Hutchinson (2014) analyse the impact of tapering news announcements 
by the Fed on emerging markets. They apply a panel framework on daily data to assess how 
emerging market asset prices respond to statements by the Fed. They also group the markets 
into those with “robust” fundamentals and those with “fragile” fundamentals. The 
fundamentals analysed are current account, international reserves and external debt. A country 
with “robust” fundamentals will have current account surpluses, high international reserves 
and low external debt (Aizenman, Binici & Hutchinson, 2014). 
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They find that emerging market stock prices and currency exchange rates decline considerably 
in response to the tapering news announcements. Interestingly, the currency exchange rates of 
the robust group were more adversely affected by the tapering news than the fragile group. 
However, cumulative effects of tapering news after a month appear to be similar for both 
groups. The fact that more financially developed economies are more impacted by tapering 
news, at least in the short term, shows that they are more exposed to external news 
announcements. 
Chen, Griffoli and Sahay (2014) add to the literature on spill overs of unconventional monetary 
policy to emerging markets by asking three questions. Firstly, do US monetary policy shocks 
have significant effects on capital flows and asset price movements of emerging market 
economies? Secondly, do these effects differ across different phases of US monetary policy 
from conventional to unconventional? Finally, do the effects of US monetary shocks depend 
on the domestic economic conditions of EMEs? 
Their results indicate that US monetary shocks do affect capital inflows and asset price 
movements in emerging market economies. They find that effects are stronger during the 
unconventional monetary policy relative to conventional monetary phase. They also find that 
countries with stronger fundamentals are subject to smaller spill overs. They find that the 
signalling channel played the leading role in transmitting monetary policy shocks.  
Bhattarai, Chatterjee and Park (2015) use a Bayesian VAR model on monthly US 
macroeconomic and financial data to first identify the US QE shock on US output, consumer 
prices, long-term yields and asset prices. The data they use for this includes US treasury 
securities, Federal agency debt securities, real GDP, private consumption expenditure deflator, 
10-year treasury yields, the S& P 500 index and nominal effective exchange rates (Bhattarai, 
Chatterjee & Park, 2015).  
They then use this US QE shock in a monthly Bayesian panel VAR model to deduce the spill 
over effects on emerging markets. The data used for this includes output, prices, US dollar 
exchange rates, the stock market index, bond index, long-term and short-term interest rates, 
monetary aggregate data and trade flows data. They find that an expansionary US QE shock 
leads to an exchange rate appreciation, a stock market boom, an increase in capital inflows and 
a reduction in long-term bond yields. The impact of the nominal exchange is around 25 basis 
points, on stock prices around 100 basis points and on long-term yields around three basis 
points (Bhattarai, Chatterjee & Park, 2015). They also find that financial markets receive more 
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capital flows following an expansionary QE shock. However, in emerging markets, they find 
no significant effect on output and consumer prices. 
3.6 Review of how Monetary Policy affects the Stock Market 
There has been a considerable amount of research done on the impact of stock market reactions 
to monetary policy surprises. The studies done on the relationship between monetary policy 
and the stock market have used a range of empirical approaches ranging from empirical studies 
to vector autoregressive models. Most literature documented agrees that there is a positive 
reaction to expansionary monetary policy surprises. However, most of this literature is before 
the crisis. 
Bernanke and Kuttner (2004) analyse the impact of changes in monetary policy on equity 
prices. The objective of their study is to measure the average reaction of the stock market to a 
policy change and to understand the economic sources of that reaction. They use the federal 
funds futures data to construct a measure of surprise rate changes (Bernanke & Kuttner, 2004). 
The main finding on their paper is that policy impact on equity prices is felt through expected 
future excess returns or on expected future dividends. In particular, they find that while an 
unanticipated rate cut causes equity prices to rise immediately, this tends to be associated with 
long periods of lower-than-normal excess returns. Very little effect on policy can be attributed 
to changes in expected real interest rates. In terms of how different sectors are affected by 
monetary policy, they find that sectors such as energy and utilities are not significantly affected 
by monetary policy while telecommunications and high-tech sectors are affected as much as 
the broad market indices (Bernanke & Kuttner, 2005). 
Kontonikas and Kostakis (2013) use a macro-based VAR approach to examine whether 
performance of stock portfolios during the period 1967-2007 was affected by unexpected US 
monetary policy actions based on their value, size and past performance. Their results show 
that value, small capitalization and past loser stocks are more affected by monetary policy 
shocks in comparison to growth, big capitalization and past winner stocks. This shows that 
when it comes to monetary policy transmission, the balance sheet transmission channel is 
important. The data they use includes FFR, inflation rate, industrial production, commodity 
price index and stock returns (Kontonikas & Kostakis, 2013). 
Kontonikas, MacDonald and Saggu (2013) examine the impact of 189 FOMC decisions on the 
FFR surprises on stock returns for the period of 1989-2009 with a focus on the impact of the 
financial crisis. Their data thus consists of federal funds rate futures contracts. Using an event 
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study, their results indicate that prior to the crisis, stock prices increased because of an 
unexpected federal rate cut. An unexpected 1% cut in the FFR is associated with almost a 4% 
increase in the S&P 500 index. They further assert that in times of recession, stock market 
prices have larger increases when interest rate is cut. This indicates that the response of the 
stock market to monetary policy is asymmetrical. During the period of 2007-2009, their 
estimates indicate that expansionary surprises in the interest rate affected the stock market 
negatively. This period was characterized by a weakening financial system and monetary 
policy was operating at the zero-lower bound. 
Unalmis and Unalmis (2015) estimate the impact of conventional and unconventional monetary 
policy surprises on asset markets in the US. The asset markets they assess are stock, treasury 
bond, corporate bond and currency markets. They use a heteroscedasticity-based General 
Method of Moments (GMM) technique on the following data stock market indices (Dow Jones 
Industrial Average, S& P 5600, NASDAQ and Wilshire 5000), treasury bond market (constant 
maturity rates on one, five, ten and thirty –year maturity bonds), corporate bond markets 
(Moody’s triple A and BAA), and exchange rate market (value of dollar versus Swiss franc, 
Japanese yen, British pound and the Euro).  They also include implied volatilities in the stock 
and bond markets (VIX and MOVE). 
They find that monetary policy surprises have statistically significant effects on the asset 
markets in both periods but the magnitude of responses differs remarkably in the 
unconventional period. The impact of monetary policy surprises on stock returns and implied 
volatilities in both stock and bond markets are found to be lower in the unconventional period. 
For other assets, responses are found to be either similar or higher in the unconventional period. 
In the Euro area, Haitsma, Unalmis and de Haan (2016) examine how stock markets respond 
to the policies of the ECB during the period 1999-2015. This enables them to incorporate both 
periods of conventional and unconventional monetary policy and crisis and non-crisis years. 
They examine the reaction of the Euro stoxx 50 index to monetary policy surprises and analyse 
the reaction of several portfolios of stocks. These portfolios are created based on firm’s 
characteristics such as size, the free cash flow to income ratio, financial leverage ratio and the 
debt-to-equity ratio. They also add two stock characteristics, namely value versus growth 
stocks and momentum. They use market prices of futures to identify surprises in 
unconventional monetary policy.  
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They find strong effects for the unconventional monetary policy surprises. Using an event study 
on daily data, their results provide weak evidence for a credit channel before the financial crisis 
and strong evidence for the credit channel for unconventional monetary policy surprises. In 
addition, their results suggest that highly leveraged firms respond strongly to policy surprises 
and value and past loser stocks show a larger reaction to policy surprises (Haitsma, Unalmis & 
de Haan, 2016). 
3.7  Conclusion 
In the US, the estimated magnitude of how QE has affected either mortgage rates or interest 
rates differed greatly. It is also not clear through which channel the asset purchases have 
affected the long-term interest rates especially in QE2 and QE3 and therefore most literature 
has concentrated on the signalling channel and the portfolio rebalancing channel. However, the 
effectiveness of these channels is still subject to debate. 
There has been little done quantitatively to analyse the interaction between forward guidance 
and Fed’s asset purchases. Unfortunately, our work also does not include it. For the reduction 
of interest rates to be able to spur economic activity, this would have meant that QE policies 
were able to lower private borrowing costs. Most literature done on QE focuses on whether the 
long-term interest rates were lowered. 
A challenge in comparing the results directly across the studies is prevalent since different 
researchers used different methodologies, data and sample periods. Other researchers have 
been careful to point out that their results should be taken with a grain of salt due to 
uncertainties in modelling. 
An important theme present in most papers was analysing whether the use of unconventional 
monetary policies can be used in future as a tool for monetary policy. Based on the impact of 
portfolio rebalancing channel, most studies agree that the UMPs were effective.  
Most of the literature reviewed agreed that QE led to a decrease in long term interest rates 
especially in developed economies. In addition, QE did not lead to currency depreciation of the 
developed countries. In fact, the US dollar, the British pound and the Japanese yen strengthened 
following major QE policy announcements.  
Most of the literature reviewed for emerging markets focused on capital flows, exchange rates, 
long term bond yields and stock market. None of the literature focused on how QE 
announcements affected the different listed stocks in a particular country but mostly focused 
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on the stock exchange index. We choose to look at how stocks were affected by these 
announcements because as mentioned earlier monetary policy will affect different industries 
differently. From the literature reviewed, we expect to find that stocks that mostly make up the 
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4. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
This chapter introduces the data, data sources and descriptive statistics for our study. We 
explain the methods used to correct and make any adjustments to the data to remove any 
irregularities. Using descriptive statistics, we will discuss any biases present in the financial 
data and what can be done to reduce the impact of the bias in line with prior literature. 
Initial data capturing and handling was done in Microsoft Excel.  
4.1 Data  
The economic and financial indicators dataset consists of the 10-year bond for the US and SA, 
the stock market index, the nominal exchange rate of Rand to US$, the quarterly GDP, portfolio 
investments and the monthly inflation rate. This dataset is used to assess the correlation 
between QE policy and movements in key macroeconomic and financial indicators in SA. 
Descriptive graphs and correlation matrix will be used to assess whether there is any movement 
on the macroeconomic indicators prompted by QE. 
To examine the effect of QE policy on the JSE stock market, we use share prices and the price 
for the All Share Index (ALSI). The ALSI is used to capture the market return which represents 
99% of the full market capitalisation value of all ordinary securities listed on the main board. 
For the portfolio analysis, we use the following indices: Financial and Industrial 30 (FINDI30), 
Resource 20 (RESI20), Financial 15 (FINI15), Industrial 25 (INDI25), Industrials (JASIN), All 
Share Ex Resources (JALEX), Small Caps(JSMLC), Banks (JBNKS), Mid-Caps (MIDCAP), 
Mining (JMNNG), Gold (JGOLD) and Platinum (JPLAT). A list of the companies and the 
indices used can be found in Appendix A. 
The JSE data was obtained from Bloomberg which is accessed from the Business Corner in 
The Research Wing at The Chancellor Oppenheimer Library, University of Cape Town. The 
frequency of the data on the share price and the index was taken daily from January 2008 to 
December 2014. This time horizon captures the important event dates on QE announcements. 
The data used for the economic and financial indicators was obtained from the IMF databank. 
The JSE has over 400 listed companies. With preference to work with a balanced panel, all the 
companies that did not have full data for the entire period were removed. This left us with 232 
listed companies. The companies are then sorted into their respective sectors.  Our definition 
of sectors is borrowed from the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB). The ICB provides a 
service to investors in quoted equity securities by grouping within homogenous subsectors. The 
subsectors are grouped into sectors, the sectors are grouped into super sectors which are further 
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aggregated into industries (FTSE, 2013). The JSE has 10 industries which are further 
disaggregated into 41 sectors. Since some of the sectors did not have any companies from the 
sample of 232 companies, the sectors used in our analysis are 34 in total.  
Complete data is very important for an empirical research as it enables the researcher to get 
robust results. Our data is subject to the level of completeness from our data source, which is 
Bloomberg. We do however, have an issue with missing data points for some of the companies. 
Haugen and Baker (1996) propose that to deal with incomplete stock returns data, one can 
assign the population mean for each of the missing data points. Doing this leaves the sample 
open to bias because these figures could have been available during the period of the analysis 
and this could impact our estimates. Haugen and Baker (1996) believe that it is more 
appropriate to assign population means than removing the incomplete stock from the 
population. Each stock in our data had 1,749 observations. This gives a total of 405,768 
observations for our analysis. We only had six missing data points in our data and these were 
therefore assigned the population mean. 
4.2 Returns, Adjustments and Biases 
Returns of the shares were calculated in Excel using the formula:  
Equation 4: Calculation of returns 
                                                       𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  
𝑃𝑖,𝑡− 𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1
            (4) 
      
where: Ri,t is the return on the stock, Pi,t is the current day share price, Pi,t-1 is the previous day 
share price. 
In calculation of the returns, dividends were ignored.  
4.2.1. Event Window Dummy  
An event window dummy variable is an independent variable that takes on the value of 0 or 1. 
In our analysis we include an event dummy which distinguishes between when the QE 
announcement was done, by assigning it a value of one and when there was no announcement, 
a value of 0 is assigned. We created three dummy variables for each of the QE announcement 
as follows: QE1 announcement was on 25th November 2008 – qe1dum; QE2 announcement 
was on 27th August 2010 – qe2dum and qe3 announcement was on 22 August 2012 – qe3dum. 
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4.2.2. Possible Bias and Solutions 
Empirical analysis that uses long periods of data are subject to various biases that can render 
the analysis meaningless or can lead to misleading results. Below we identify the potential 
biases in our analysis and what was done to minimize them. 
4.2.2.1. Survivorship bias 
When a database excludes several firms that have become individually inactive, Haugen and 
Baker (1996) suggest that this data is prone to survival bias. When an analysis is done on only 
firms that have survived, the results could be upwardly biased since surviving companies will 
look better than those that no longer exist. This will mean that parameter estimates in the 
database will be misleading. 
To avoid this bias, we used the actual membership of the companies listed on the JSE. This 
includes all companies that were suspended. 
4.2.2.2. Data snooping 
According to Haugen and Baker (1996), data snooping occurs when researchers “(a) examine 
the properties of the database or the result of other studies of a database, (b) build predictive 
models using promising factors based in the previous results and then (c) test the power of their 
models on the same database” (Haugen & Baker, 1996:5). They advise that employing data 
from markets that have not been studied extensively or predicting by using new time periods 
can address this problem. 
Many studies have been done using share returns on the JSE. However, this study uses an event 
study analysis to test for the impact of QE and this has not been done before. 
4.3  Descriptive Statistics 
Here we describe the basic features of our data. This helps us to gain an initial understanding 
of our data. Table 2 below presents the summary statistics of the variables. 
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Table 2: Summary statistics of the variables 
 
Notes: Standard deviations captures the overall variation from the mean, between and within variation. 
Total number of companies is 232. N represents the total number of observations; n represents the 
number of firms while T represents the number of daily observations per firm. 
 
The table above shows the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, skewness 
and kurtosis of our variables. Our data constitute a panel of 232 companies observed for 1,749 
days. The total number of observations is equal to 405,768. The standard deviation captures 
the variation of variables from their mean value (overall, between and within). Variation over 
time for a given variable is known as “within variation” and variation across firms is called the 
“between variation”. Individual-invariant regressors have zero between variation (Cameron & 
Trivedi, 2009).  
The overall mean for the returns was 0.0006979 while the mean for the returns for the all share 
index was 0.0003902. In addition, it is possible to observe if we have any outliers in the mean 
returns. A general rule of thumb is that a series contains outliers if it is greater or less than the 
sample mean plus or minus three times the standard deviation. For example, the maximum 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis Observations
return 0,0007 0,0000 0,0395 -0,8909 6,0833 19,4045 1982,0570 N =  405768
0,0011 -0,0015 0,0094 n =     232
0,0395 -0,8945 6,0798 T =    1749
ALSI return 0,0004 0,0005 0,0132 -0,0730 0,0707 0,4203 6,9185 N =  405768
0,0000 0,0004 0,0004 n =     232
0,0132 -0,0730 0,0707 T =    1749
S&P 500 93,7132 91,2124 22,0094 46,7488 143,4099 0,4150 2,4980 N =  405768
0,0000 93,7132 93,7132 n =     232
22,0094 46,7488 143,4099 T =    1749
US 10-yr bond 2,8034 2,7500 0,7183 1,4300 4,2700 0,0036 1,8448 N =  405768
0,0000 2,8034 2,8034 n =     232
0,7183 1,4300 4,2700 T =    1749
SA 10-yr bond 8,3855 8,4070 0,6230 6,5780 10,6450 -0,0437 3,7570 N =  405768
0,0000 8,3855 8,3855 n =     232
0,6230 6,5780 10,6450 T =    1749
Nominal Exch. 
Rate 8,4518 8,0650 1,2679 6,5686 11,5650 0,5604 2,0270 N =  405768
0,0000 8,4518 8,4518 n =     232
1,2679 6,5686 11,5650 T =    1749
Emerging market 11,4488 10,2200 4,3906 5,8000 32,9600 1,9721 7,6453 N =  405768
volatility index 0,0000 11,4488 11,4488 n =     232
4,3906 5,8000 32,9600 T =    1749
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return in our sample is equal to 6.08, which is an outlier using this criterion. However, since 
our interest is to identify abnormal returns because of QE, we chose not to drop these extreme 
values as they may be reflecting critical information that is the focus of this study. 
Table 3 below lists the summary statistics for the different sectors used in our analysis. The 
summary statistics were calculated using the returns for all the companies in our dataset. The 
mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, maximum and the number of firms are presented 
for each sector. Sectors like Automobiles & Parts, Leisure Goods, Personal Goods and Fixed 
Line Telecommunications have only one company.  Companies in the mining sector have the 
highest mean of 0.0148435 while the company in Personal Goods has a mean of 0. 
Table 3: Sector summary statistics 
 
 
Sector Code Sector name Mean Std. Dev Min Median Max No.Firms
570 Oil Equipment & Services 0,0017 0,0144 -0,0085 0,0017 0,0119 2
1350 Chemicals 0,0062 0,0237 -0,0321 0,0000 0,0412 7
1730 Forestry & Paper -0,0233 0,0180 -0,0381 -0,0276 0,0000 4
1750 Industrial Metals & Mining -0,0046 0,0125 -0,0283 -0,0048 0,0270 13
1770 Mining 0,0148 0,0459 -0,1033 0,0000 0,1429 23
2350 Construction & Materials -0,0036 0,0107 -0,0352 0,0000 0,0101 16
2720 General Industries -0,0242 0,0280 -0,0604 -0,0283 0,0350 9
2730 Electronic & Electrical Equipment -0,0075 0,0191 -0,0439 -0,0027 0,0251 10
2750 Industrial Engineering -0,0107 0,0309 -0,0419 -0,0142 0,0276 4
2770 Industrial Transportation 0,0013 0,0341 -0,0310 -0,0018 0,0656 6
2790 Support Services -0,0009 0,0113 -0,0196 0,0000 0,0256 11
3350 Automobiles & Parts -0,0271 -0,0271 -0,0271 -0,0271 1
3530 Beverages -0,0017 0,0029 -0,0050 0,0000 0,0000 3
3570 Food Producers -0,0088 0,0121 -0,0383 -0,0045 0,0000 10
3720
H usehol  Goods and Home 
Construction -0,0102 0,0144 -0,0204 -0,0102 0,0000 2
3740 Leisure Goods -0,0185 -0,0185 -0,0185 -0,0185 1
3760 Personal Goods 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 1
4530 Health care Equipment & Services -0,0284 0,0200 -0,0476 -0,0299 -0,0078 3
4570 Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology -0,0064 0,0499 -0,0417 -0,0064 0,0289 2
5330 Food & Drug Retailers -0,0153 0,0094 -0,0290 -0,0114 -0,0091 4
5370 General Retailers -0,0077 0,0200 -0,0429 0,0000 0,0465 18
5550 Media -0,0098 0,0162 -0,0337 -0,0028 0,0000 4
5750 Travel & Leisure -0,0011 0,0077 -0,0106 0,0000 0,0137 8
6530 Fixed-line Telecomm. -0,0179 -0,0179 -0,0179 -0,0179 1
6570 Mobile Communications -0,0161 0,0148 -0,0266 -0,0161 -0,0057 2
8350 Banks -0,0149 0,0127 -0,0323 -0,0180 0,0000 7
8530 Nonlife Insurance 0,0025 0,0035 0,0000 0,0025 0,0049 2
8570 Life Insurance -0,0127 0,0023 -0,0162 -0,0125 -0,0102 5
8630 Real Estate Investment & Services -0,0065 0,0150 -0,0500 0,0000 0,0000 12
8670 Real Estate Investment Trusts 0,0017 0,0132 -0,0253 0,0000 0,0230 9
8770 General Financial -0,0078 0,0117 -0,0388 -0,0020 0,0000 12
8980 Equity Investment Instruments 0,0036 0,0109 0,0000 0,0000 0,0326 9
9530 Software & Computer Services 0,0008 0,0176 -0,0237 0,0000 0,0429 9
9570 Technology Hardware & Equipment -0,0052 0,0073 -0,0103 -0,0052 0,0000 2
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5. Methodology 
The semi strong form of efficient market hypothesis suggests that a company’s share price 
reflects all the available information about the prospects of the company. This implies that the 
speed and the accuracy of how the information flows to market participants is important. 
Empirical evidence regarding the efficiency of the JSE has not been conclusive (Bonga-Bonga 
& Makakabule, 2010).  Van Heerden et al., (2013) notes that the variation in the findings could 
be because the studies do not take into consideration possible nonlinear behaviour in the JSE 
stock indices. Using the runs tests and random walks test, Smith, Jefferis and Ryoo (2002), 
Magnusson and Wydick (2002) and Jefferis and Smith (2005) find the JSE to be weak-form 
efficient. On the contrary, Appiah-Kusi and Menyah (2003) conclude that the JSE is not weak-
form efficient for the period between 1990 to 1995 but reverts to weak-form efficient from 
2000 onwards. Grater and Struweg (2014) using both the Augmented Dickey-Fuller and 
Phillip-Perron tests find the JSE was not weak form efficient for the period between 1999 and 
2014. 
Using Grater and Struweg’s (2014) findings, we assume that the JSE was semi strong efficient 
during the period 2008 -2014. To make an analysis on how an event affects stock prices, an 
event study analysis would be appropriate. In the section that follows we outline the procedure 
for an event study. 
5.1 Event study methodology 
The first step in an event study is to identify the event dates. The event dates we use are as 
defined by Montecino and Eipsten (2015). Their focus is on the initial announcement of QE 
which they identify as any hint that provides information on a new QE program. The reason 
we also focus on each QE program is because we are interested in finding out whether different 
QE programs had different impacts on listed companies and sectors on the JSE.  
Three dates are identified. On 25 November 2008, the Federal Open Market Committee made 
a statement and this was identified as the first hint of QE. For QE2, Ben Bernanke’s speech on 
August 27, 2010 is identified. Finally, the minutes released by the FOMC on August 22,2012 
reflect the announcement of QE3. 
The second step is to identify estimation, and event windows. The estimation window is the 
period before the event date over which parameters are estimated. The estimation window is 
used to determine the normal behaviour of stock with respect to market factors. A research 
meta reviewing over 400 event studies found that estimation window lengths vary from 30 to 
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750 days.  Studies investigating the sensitivity of results suggest that results are not sensitive 
to varying estimation window lengths. 
The event window is the period of trading days over which we calculate abnormal returns. We 
use data from this window in conjunction with α and β of the stock estimated over the 
estimation window to calculate abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns. Event windows 
range between 1 and 11 days and they centre around the event day (Holler, 2014). The figure 
below provides a summary of the event study timeline. 
Figure 3: Event study timeline 
(Estimation window]           (Event window]   (Post event window] 
 
        T0    T1    0   T2   T3 
Adapted from Beninga, 2008 
 
We focus on the reaction of the stock prices over a narrow interval after the QE-related news 
(event window) is released. How large to make the event window is determined by our own 
judgement. If we make it too long, then there is the risk that the news could be contaminated 
by other news events; if we make it too short we could miss the full market reaction as it may 
take time for the market to evaluate the news and reflect it on the stock prices. Therefore, in 
our analysis we use a two-day window, but for robustness we also examine the impact using a 
three-day window. 
The third step is to estimate the alpha(α) and betas(β) of the stocks over the estimation window. 
In this paper, we make use of the market model to find the expected returns. This model 
assumes a linear and constant relation between the individual asset returns and the returns of 
the market index. It theorizes that the only factor determining the return of stock i in time t, is 
the return of the market at time t. 
Equation 5: Obtaining α and β 
                                                             𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡             (10)                                                                   
   with 𝐸[𝜖𝑖,𝑡] = 0   and  𝑉𝐴𝑅[𝜖𝑖,𝑡] = 𝜎𝜖𝑖
2  
 where 𝑡 is the time index; i=1, 2,.,N; 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑅𝑀,𝑡 are the returns on security i and the market 
index respectively during period 𝑡 and 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 is the error term for security i. This regression helps 
us to estimate normal performance for each company within the estimation window. The alphas 
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and betas obtained will be used to predict normal performance during the event window 
(Princeton University, 2008). 
The fourth step is to measure the abnormal returns (AR) and the cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) in the event window. The abnormal return is the difference between the actual return 
and the predicted normal return. The predicted normal return is obtained with the estimates 𝛼𝑖 
and 𝛽𝑖 obtained from equation (10). The cumulative abnormal return is the sum of the abnormal 
return over the event window. We calculate the AR for each observation in the event window. 
We then set the CARs to be equal to the sum of the AR for each company  (Princeton 
University, 2008). 
Equation 6: Abnormal Returns 
                                                              𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝛼?̂? − 𝛽?̂?𝑅𝑀,𝑡                                 (11) 
Equation 7: Cumulative Abnormal Returns - Companies 
                                                               𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑇1,𝑇2) = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑇2
𝑡=𝑇1
                                            (12) 
 
To assess the impact of QE on the different sectors, we calculate the average of the cumulative 
abnormal returns in each sector. 
Equation 8: Cumulative Abnormal Returns - Sectors 





𝑖=1                                        (13) 
where i=1, 2,..,N are companies in sector j. 
5.2 Portfolio Methodology 
To create our hypothetical portfolio, we use the Solver add-in in excel. Our input in Solver is 
a minimization objective function subject to one constraint. The objective function is to 
minimize the coefficient of variation of the portfolio.  The coefficient of variation (CV) 
measures the volatility of an investment in comparison to the expected return. The CV is 
calculated as follows: 




                                                                      (14)                                                     
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where CVp is the Coefficient of variation, E(Rp) is the expected return of the portfolio and σp 
is the standard deviation of the portfolio.  
The model used is to minimize CV subject to the portfolio weight. 
Equation 10: Portfolio weight 
∑ 𝑋𝑖
𝑛
1 = 1                                                                  (15) 
where X is the weight of the portfolio. This means the portfolio weights must be equal to one; 
n is the number of indices. The following assumptions were used: 
 All optimal weightings are based on historical returns and the variation within those 
returns. We therefore note that past performance cannot be used as a basis for future 
performance. 
 The average returns of each index were altered according to the abnormal returns for 
each QE. 
 The covariance matrix was left unchanged. This is because it represents the relationship 
between the indices and the market for the period used in the analysis. Changing the 
covariance matrix means altering the details of how the indices change together and 
how this would relate to the market. This would have an impact on the diversification 
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6. Results and Discussion 
In this section, we present the exploratory analysis of the impact of QE on the macroeconomy 
and the empirical results of how QE affected different sectors. Finally, we present an 
investment strategy for the JSE sectors following the results of QE impact on sectors.  
6.1 QE and the Macroeconomy in South Africa 
The exploratory analysis on the macroeconomy shows that the slowdown in economic activity 
after the financial crisis caused a contraction in GDP during the quarter when QE1 was 
announced. For the quarters when QE2 and QE3 were announced, GDP growth rate was 
increasing, although at a lower rate in 2012. Global economic activity did not have much 
impact on inflation. 
The rand is a very volatile currency so its performance can be at the mercy of global events. 
On average, the rand has been weakening since the financial crisis began. However, during the 
QE phase, there are other factors that contributed to its weakening. This included large current 
account deficit, weak GDP and labour unrest. The last quarter of 2008 saw a decline in portfolio 
investments as investors preferred to invest in safe markets due to uncertainty in global 
markets. This was, however, followed by inflows as they sought to benefit from higher yield 
in emerging markets. Most of the inflows were in the bond market. Despite capital raised in 
equity markets being lower than the periods before the crisis, there is still evidence to show 
that some of the capital inflow was in the stock markets. Detailed analysis on the 
macroeconomic indicators can be found in Appendix B. 
6.2 QE and Listed Companies in South Africa 
We will first present the broad trends in distribution of CARs across individual firms in each 
of the QE phase. Next, we will discuss the distribution of CARs across the sectors. 
6.2.1. Stock-Level Analysis 
In this section, we consider the impact of quantitative easing on individual firm stock returns. 
The tables with results on the stock-level analysis are in Appendix C. 
On the day of QE1 announcement, 54.4 % of the companies had positive returns, 29.1% of the 
companies had zero returns while 16.5% had negative returns. The highest returns were 
recorded by SNV (Santova Ltd) with 0.4 which is in the Support Services sector. SNV is 
referred to as a penny stock. A penny stock is a stock which is cheap and has low market cap. 
Penny stocks are however very volatile. 
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We calculate the cumulative abnormal returns for each of the 232 companies in our dataset. 
We compute a test statistic to check whether the average abnormal return for each stock is 
statistically different from zero. We used a t-test to decide if the cumulative abnormal returns 
are statistically significant or not. If the calculated t-statistic is greater than 1.96 then the 
abnormal return for that stock is statistically significant at the 5% level.  
In QE1, 29.3% (68 companies) of the companies had abnormal returns which were statistically 
significant with 13 companies having positive significant CARs. These companies represent 
27 sectors out of the 34 sectors. Most of the companies that had significant abnormal returns 
were from the general retailers’ sector (5370) with ten companies followed by the Support 
services sector (2790) with five companies.   
The large number of companies with significant negative abnormal returns is consistent with 
what was happening in the economy since the markets were under pressure. Mining companies 
like Assore Ltd (ASR) and Impala Platinum Holdings benefited from the boom the resource 
shares had enjoyed before the financial crisis. Interest-sensitive shares like FirstRand (FSR), 
Putprop (PPR) and Zurich Insurance (ZSA) seem to have benefited from the low interest rate 
environment. Awethu Beverages (AWT) and Crookes Brother Limited (CKS) are part of 
consumer goods and can fall under defensive stocks which are not affected by the economic 
cycle. Other industrial stocks which had significant positive CARs are Cargo Carriers Ltd. 
(CRG), Micromega (MMG) and Reunert (RLO). 
Some of the companies that had significant negative returns are large companies that are largely 
affected by interest rates specific to SA. These include Bidvest Group (BVT), Massmart 
Holdings (MSM), Shoprite Holdings (SHP), and Truworths (TRU). Old Mutual (OML) was 
impacted by the global financial markets due to its US Life Business. Included in the negative 
CARs is Steinhoff Holdings (SNH) which acts as an industrial hedge on the JSE because of its 
distinct global reach and its earnings and market value are not measured in rand value. 
Performance of companies on the day QE2 was announced seemed to be equally distributed 
between zero, positive and negative returns.  36.6% of the companies had zero returns, 32.8% 
had negative returns while 30.6% had positive returns. The highest returns recorded on that 
day were from PAN (PAN African Resource) with 0.0526. PAN had recorded -0.08 on the day 
of QE1 announcement. SNV which had the highest returns for QE1 had -0.14286 returns on 
27th August 2010. 
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There was a reduction in the number of companies that had significant CARs the day of QE2 
announcement. Only 12.1% (28 companies) of the companies had cumulative abnormal returns 
that were statistically significant with 12 companies having CARs that were positive. Most of 
the companies were from the General Retailers sector (5370) with five companies. Consumer 
services and consumer goods stocks are defensive shares. Several of these had positive 
significant CARs. These are Tiger Brands (TBS), Clicks Food & Drug (CLS), Cullinan 
Holdings (CUL), Mr. Price (MRP), The Foschini Group (TFG) and Woolworths (WHL). 
Healthcare stocks are also categorised as defensive stocks but we find Mediclinic (MDC) with 
negative significant CARs. According to Advantage Asset Managers, the MDC share had lost 
1.6% for a three-month period ending August 2010  (Advantage Asset Managers, 2010).  
Another share which is not expected to be affected by the economy is Distell (DST). This is 
because it is a ‘sin stock’ and therefore its demand, even in times of economic downturn, should 
be stable (Salaber, 2009).  
A recovery in commodity prices between the period of 2009-2011 boosted the resources stock. 
Aquarius Platinum(AQP) and DRD gold (DRD) reported significant CARs. However, Village 
Main Reef (VIL) and ArcelorMittal SA Ltd (ACL) had significant negative CARs. 
On the day of QE3 announcement, 34.1% of the companies had zero returns, 39% had negative 
returns while 29.9% had positive returns. The highest returns on that day were recorded by 
MED (Middle East Diamond Res Ltd) with 0.156. During QE1 and QE2 announcements, MED 
had recorded zero returns. In addition, our analysis shows that 21.6% (50 companies) of the 
companies had cumulative abnormal returns that were statistically significant on the day of 
QE3 announcement. 26% of the companies had positive significant CARs. This is an indication 
that by the time QE3 was being announced investors had increased their interest in the SA 
financial market. These companies belonged to 23 sectors of the 34 sectors in our analysis.  
In 2012, commodity prices started experiencing a slowdown. This affected the resource 
companies on the JSE. However, companies such as Atlatsa resource group (ATL), Hwange 
Colliery Company (HWA), Northum Platinum Ltd (NHM), Pan African resource PLC (PAN) 
and Rockwell Diamonds Incor (RDI) had significant positive CARs.  Despite demand for coal 
increasing both locally and internationally (PWC, 2012), Coal of Africa (CZA) and Wescoal 
Holdings Ltd. (WSL) had significant negative CARs. Other resource companies that had 
negative CARs are African Rainbow Metals (ARI) and Mondi (MND). As a rand-hedge stock 
Steinhoff (SNH) reported a positive CAR. 
48 | P a g e  
 
An analysis of the means of the CARs suggests that the greatest impacted of QE was felt in 
phase one. The CARs in QE1 had a mean of – 0.229159. QE2 had a positive mean of 0.0018942 
while QE3 saw a slight reduction in the means to -0.0004868.  
Finally, three companies seemed to experience significant CARs throughout the three phases 
of QE. These are Culliana Holdings Ltd (CUL), Zurich Insurance Co. (ZSA) and Nu-World 
Holdings (NWL). However, CUL and ZSA which had positive CARs in QE1 and QE2 had 
negative in QE3 while NWL which had negative CAR in QE1 and QE2 received positive CAR 
in QE3. Table 4, 5 and 6 shows the common companies that had significant CARs in QE1 and 
QE2; QE1, QE2 and QE3 and QE1 and QE3. 
Table 4: Companies with significant CARs in QE1 and QE2 
 










Zurich Insurance Co SA
Negative CARs
African Oxygen Ltd Rex Trueform Clothing Company
African and Overseas Enterprises Ltd Tradehold Ltd
Nu-World Holdings Limited Village Main Reef Ltd
Negative to Positive CAR
Mr Price Group Limited
QE1& QE2
Positive to Negative CARs
Culliana Holdings Ltd
Zurich Insurance Co SA
Negative to Positive CAR
Nu-World Holdings Limited
QE1& QE2 & QE3
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Table 6: Companies with significant CARs in QE1 and QE3 
 
Table 6 above shows that most of the companies that had negative CARs in QE1 turned to have 
positive CARs by QE3. 
 
6.2.2. Sector-Level Analysis 
 
Table 7 below shows the cumulative abnormal returns for the sectors in QE1. 
Negative to Positive CAR





Northam Platinum Ltd Npl
Shoprite Holdings Ltd
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Table 7: Cumulative abnormal returns across sectors in QE1  
 
Notes: QE1 date is 25th November 2008 
 
The t-statistics indicate that 26 out of the 34 sectors had significant abnormal returns at the 5% 
level.  Five of these were positive while 21 were negative. In the US, the sectors that benefited 
from QE1 were energy, construction, auto and large financial firms. In SA, these sectors lost 





1 570 Oil Equipment & Services 0,0000 -0,2302 -2,5328**
2 1350 Chemicals 0,0026 -0,3471 -14,857***
3 1730 Forestry&Paper 0,0191 -0,3369 -4,9428***
4 1750 Industrial Metals&Mining 0,0608 0,0297 0,8078
5 1770 Mining 0,0126 1,0603 22,39***
6 2350 Construction & Materials 0,0229 -0,5720 -40,455***
7 2720 General Industries -0,0044 -0,5245 -26,221***
8 2730 Electronic & Electrical Equipment 0,0383 -0,2683 -12,193***
9 2750 Industrial Engineering -0,0056 -0,4828 -12,197***
10 2770 Industrial Transportation -0,0016 -0,2747 -10,25***
11 2790 Support Services 0,0448 -0,0481 -1,0840
12 3350 Automobiles & Parts 0,0000 -0,0209 -0,6193
13 3530 Beverages 0,0172 0,1491 3,50497***
14 3570 Food Producers 0,0134 0,0935 17,3877***
15 3720 Household Goods and Home Construction 0,0093 -0,2597 -13,183***
16 3740 Leisure Goods 0,0599 -0,0713 -1,4091
17 3760 Personal Goods -0,0204 0,0448 1,3520
18 4530 Health care Equipment & Services 0,0000 -0,2033 -6,3903***
19 4570 Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 0,0000 -0,1132 -6,0317***
20 5330 Food & Drug Retailers 0,0371 -0,3617 -10,523***
21 5370 General Retailers 0,0032 -0,5845 -26,006***
22 5550 Media -0,0104 -0,1152 -2,9721***
23 5750 Travel & Leisure 0,0236 -0,1513 -7,2336***
24 6530 Fixed Line Telecommunications 0,0224 0,0066 0,5296
25 6570 Mobile Communications 0,0193 -0,1216 -2,2757**
26 8350 Banks 0,0410 -0,1868 -5,0081***
27 8530 Nonlife Insurance 0,0078 -0,0434 -5,9317***
28 8570 Life Insurance 0,0260 -0,4486 -12,509***
29 8630 Real Estate Investment & Services 0,0080 0,0628 3,36374***
30 8670 Real Estate Investment Trusts 0,0238 0,2242 12,4403***
31 8770 General Financial 0,0042 -0,2933 -7,8933***
32 8980 Equity Investment Instruments -0,0159 -0,0305 -1,0736
33 9530 Software & Computer Services 0,0097 -0,7698 -31,862***
34 9570 Technology Hardware & Equipment 0,0527 -0,1279 -1,5006
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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The JSE SA Sector categorizes listed shares into three broad categories, namely SA Resources 
which comprises of companies in the Oil & Gas and Basic materials sector; SA Financial which 
comprises of companies in the financial sector and finally SA industrial which has all the other 
companies that are not listed as resources or financial. Our empirical analysis suggests that 
most of the sectors that had significant cumulative abnormal returns are in the industrial sector.  
Prior to the 2008/2009 market crash, the indices that track these sectors moved closely together. 
In 2008, most of the resource stocks were believed to be attractively valued compared to the 
industrials and financial stocks. The resources sector was benefitting from higher commodity 
prices and a weaker rand.  The global commodities market had been experiencing a boom from 
the period between 2000 to around 2008 (Gruss, 2014). This was attributed to an increasing 
demand for commodities in the emerging markets; the role of biofuels in fuelling demand for 
specific food crops; slow supply responses that amplified price pressures; linkages between 
commodities that could have transmitted higher prices and finally low interest rates and 
effective dollar depreciation (Helbing, Blackman & Cheng, 2008). The banking and insurance 
sector in SA was not exposed to the sub-prime crisis. However, the four major banks had a 
rocky start as the financial crisis began. The global deleveraging process and lower financial 
markets caused a period of low profit growth in financial markets. 
World financial markets started to recover in the first quarter of 2009 and the South African 
market was not left behind. The demand for commodities started plunging in 2009, weakening 
commodity prices and in turn affecting the resources sector. Following the decline in 
commodity prices, the resource shares started experiencing poor returns. On average, in August 
2010, the financial sector delivered better results than industrials and the resource sector. Table 
8 below shows the cumulative abnormal returns for the sectors in QE2. 
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Table 8: Cumulative abnormal returns across sectors in QE2 
 
Notes: QE2 was announced on 27th August 2010 
On the day of QE2 announcement, only 13 sectors had significant cumulative abnormal returns, 
eight of these were positive while five were negative.  
In 2010, South Africa hosted the FIFA World Cup. This was expected to mitigate the effects 
of the financial crisis. Sectors that were boosted by the World Cup included Construction & 
Materials, Tourism, Transport and other industries. An increase in acquisition in the mining, 





1 570 Oil Equipment & Services 0,0063 -0,012 -0,0949
2 1350 Chemicals 0 -0,1292 -4,8629***
3 1730 Forestry&Paper 0,0086 0,0085 0,2645
4 1750 Industrial Metals&Mining -0,0097 -0,0002 -0,0051
5 1770 Mining 0,0003 0,0987 0,9823
6 2350 Construction & Materials -0,0026 0,1516 2,8962***
7 2720 General Industries -0,0031 -0,1344 -5,0220***
8 2730 Electronic & Electrical Equipment 0,0026 -0,0164 -0,4846
9 2750 Industrial Engineering 0,0051 -0,0522 -1,124
10 2770 Industrial Transportation 0,0023 0,2155 3,1581***
11 2790 Support Services -0,0119 -0,0359 -0,4918
12 3350 Automobiles & Parts -0,005 -0,0347 -1,3236
13 3530 Beverages -0,0086 -0,0564 -3,2509***
14 3570 Food Producers 0,0101 0,1061 3,7829***
15 3720 Household Goods and Home Construction -0,0005 -0,0141 -1,1539
16 3740 Leisure Goods -0,0018 -0,0196 -1,1121
17 3760 Personal Goods -0,0182 -0,0166 -0,7933
18 4530 Health care Equipment & Services -0,004 -0,0535 -0,9063
19 4570 Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology -0,0001 0,0137 0,6555
20 5330 Food & Drug Retailers 0,0124 0,0699 4,2202***
21 5370 General Retailers 0,007 0,1238 3,6766***
22 5550 Media -0,0056 -0,0082 -0,3075
23 5750 Travel & Leisure 0,0012 -0,0026 -0,1681
24 6530 Fixed Line Telecommunications 0,0074 0,0296 3,0482***
25 6570 Mobile Communications -0,0099 0,0486 0,972
26 8350 Banks -0,0027 -0,0252 -1,2808
27 8530 Nonlife Insurance 0 -0,0053 -1,015
28 8570 Life Insurance -0,0027 -0,0666 -2,0731**
29 8630 Real Estate Investment & Services 0,0011 -0,0822 -3,2791***
30 8670 Real Estate Investment Trusts 0,006 0,0673 4,3010***
31 8770 General Financial 0,0056 0,2924 4,6665***
32 8980 Equity Investment Instruments -0,0206 -0,1291 -1,6346
33 9530 Software & Computer Services -0,0039 0,0552 1,3789
34 9570 Technology Hardware & Equipment 0,0054 0,0529 1,3661
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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QE2 shows a slight increase in the number of sectors that had positive cumulative abnormal 
returns. This is also the case for firms and sectors in the US. This is reflecting that by the time 
QE2 was being announced, investors’ expectations were less dispersed as to which sectors 
would gain or lose from QE. 
Table 9  below shows the cumulative abnormal returns for the sectors in QE3. 
Table 9: Cumulative abnormal returns across sectors in QE3 
 






1 570 Oil Equipment & Services 0 -0,0877 -1,4235
2 1350 Chemicals -0,0106 -0,0859 -1,9236*
3 1730 Forestry&Paper -0,0108 -0,1368 -6,7950***
4 1750 Industrial Metals&Mining -0,0109 -0,3099 -9,5008***
5 1770 Mining -0,0026 0,0374 0,3793
6 2350 Construction & Materials 0,0057 0,2303 3,0667***
7 2720 General Industries -0,0014 -0,0458 -1,3097
8 2730 Electronic & Electrical Equipment -0,0039 -0,2964 -5,9874***
9 2750 Industrial Engineering -0,0055 0,0093 0,4402
10 2770 Industrial Transportation 0,015 0,1828 5,4077***
11 2790 Support Services -0,0141 -0,0981 -1,6815*
12 3350 Automobiles & Parts 0,0222 0,116 2,7885***
13 3530 Beverages -0,0014 0,1605 1,2194
14 3570 Food Producers 0,0014 0,0987 3,7065***
15 3720 Household Goods and Home Construction 0,0008 0,0239 4,3922***
16 3740 Leisure Goods -0,0036 0,0037 0,1952
17 3760 Personal Goods -0,0143 -0,0379 -2,1614**
18 4530 Health care Equipment & Services 0,0034 -0,0223 -1,141
19 4570 Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 0,0023 0,0022 0,0961
20 5330 Food & Drug Retailers -0,0051 0,0968 3,6189***
21 5370 General Retailers 0,0089 0,3267 7,1969***
22 5550 Media -0,0031 -0,0138 -0,6308
23 5750 Travel & Leisure -0,0024 0,0194 0,8566
24 6530 Fixed Line Telecommunications 0,0047 0,0875 1,4492
25 6570 Mobile Communications 0,0049 0,1371 4,4310***
26 8350 Banks -0,0014 -0,0987 -1,189
27 8530 Nonlife Insurance 0,0039 0,0175 1,2053
28 8570 Life Insurance -0,004 -0,0502 -2,5958***
29 8630 Real Estate Investment & Services 0,0036 -0,1786 -4,2808***
30 8670 Real Estate Investment Trusts 0,0039 -0,0972 -2,7419***
31 8770 General Financial -0,0037 -0,1129 -5,0029***
32 8980 Equity Investment Instruments -0,0046 -0,1009 -4,7360***
33 9530 Software & Computer Services -0,0071 0,1493 2,1018**
34 9570 Technology Hardware & Equipment -0,0009 -0,0391 -2,5119**
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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On the day of QE3 announcement, 19 sectors had CARs that were statistically significant. 
Positive and significant CARs were reported in nine sectors while 10 reported negative 
significant CARs.  
The industrial sector continued to perform well following QE3 announcement. In our analysis, 
apart from Personal Goods (3760), the rest of the sectors had significant CARs. The share 
prices of retailers such as Woolworths, Foschini and Mr. Price had risen by almost 40%. The 
low interest rates environment encouraged domestic spending. This can be seen in the increase 
in vehicle sales and retail sales (SARB, 2012). As such, retail companies had improved bottom 
line earnings. Since 2003, the dividend yield of retail companies had grown by about 27.1% 
(Kantor, 2012). Their dividend yield and growth opportunity makes them appealing in an 
economy plagued by low interest rates. 
The commodity downward cycle continued to weigh down on earnings from resource shares. 
This can be seen from the negative significant CARs in Forestry & Paper (1730) and Industrial 
Metals & Mining (1750). The mining sector was also faced with quite a few challenges 
including the tragic events at Marikana and widespread labour disputes. Due to the 
interdependencies in the economy, the impact of the platinum strikes went through other all 
sectors. According to Jordaan (2016), the wholesale and retail sector lost close to R2 billion, 
the financial services lost almost R1.8 billion, the transport sector lost R1.6 billion, the real-
estate sector lost R1.1 billion while other services lost R1.5 billion (Jordaan, 2016). 
A look at the summary statistics of the CARs across the three phases of QE suggests that QE1 
had the most impact. The mean of the CARs in QE1 was -0.111508, QE2 was 0.0362279 while 
QE3 had -0.0033881. The summary statistics are presented in Appendix D. In the US, the 
expected benefits of QE to sectors as measured by CARs experienced a vanishing effect as QE 
progressed. Monetcino and Eipsten (2015) refer to this as a ‘QE fatigue’ on the US business 
sectors. 
Table 10: Summary of the sector results 
Significance 1% 5% 10% 
QE1 only       
  Chemicals Oil Equipment & Services   
  Forestry&Paper Mobile Communications   
  Mining     
  Construction & Materials   
  
 
  General Industries     
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Significance 1% 5% 10% 
  
Electronic & Electrical 
Equipment     
  Industrial Engineering     
  Industrial Transportation     
  Beverages     
  Food Producers     
  
Household Goods and Home 
Construction     
  
Health care Equipment & 
Services     
  
Pharmaceuticals & 
Biotechnology     
  Food & Drug Retailers     
  General Retailers      
  Media     
  Travel & Leisure     
  Banks     
  Nonlife Insurance     
  Life Insurance     
  
Real Estate Investment & 
Services     
  Real Estate Investment Trusts     
  General Financial     
  Software & Computer Services     
        
QE2 only       
  Chemicals Life Insurance   
  Construction & Materials     
  General Industries     
  Industrial Transportation     
  Beverages     
  Food Producers     
  Food & Drug Retailers     
  General Retailers      
  Fixed Line Telecommunications     
  
Real Estate Investment & 
Services     
  Real Estate Investment Trusts     
  General Financial     
QE3 only       
  Forestry&Paper Personal Goods  Chemicals 
  Industrial Metals&Mining 




  Construction & Materials 
Technology Hardware & 
Equipment   
  
Electronic & Electrical 
Equipment     
  Industrial Transportation     
  Automobiles & Parts     
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Significance 1% 5% 10% 
  Food Producers     
  
Household Goods and Home 
Construction     
  Food & Drug Retailers     
  General Retailers      
  Mobile Communications     
  Life Insurance     
  
Real Estate Investment & 
Services     
  Real Estate Investment Trusts     
  General Financial     
  Equity Investment Instruments     
QE1 & QE2       
  Chemicals     
  Construction & Materials     
  General Industries     
  Industrial Transportation     
  Beverages     
  Food Producers     
  Food & Drug Retailers     
  General Retailers      
  
Real Estate Investment & 
Services     
  Real Estate Investment Trusts     
  General Financial     
        
QE1 & QE3       
  Forestry&Paper     
  Construction & Materials     
  
Electronic & Electrical 
Equipment     
  Industrial Transportation     
  Food Producers     
  
Household Goods and Home 
Construction     
  Food & Drug Retailers     
  General Retailers      
  Life Insurance     
  
Real Estate Investment & 
Services     
  Real Estate Investment Trusts     
  General Financial     
QE2 & QE3       
  Construction & Materials     
  Industrial Transportation     
  Food Producers     
  Food & Drug Retailers     
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Significance 1% 5% 10% 
  General Retailers      
  
Real Estate Investment & 
Services     
  Real Estate Investment Trusts     
  General Financial     
        
QE1 & QE2 & 
QE3       
  Construction & Materials     
  Industrial Transportation     
  Food Producers     
  Food & Drug Retailers     
  General Retailers      
  
Real Estate Investment & 
Services     
  Real Estate Investment Trusts     
  General Financial     
        
 
The table above shows that only eight sectors had significant CARs across the three phases of 
QE. Our results, both at the company and sector level, indicate that QE1 had the greatest 
impact. Contrary to our results, most studies show that QE1 had a positive impact on emerging 
market economies.  
6.2.3. Robust Analysis 
For sensitivity analysis, we increase the event window to three days. In addition, we regress 
equation (8) on a constant to obtain the average abnormal returns per sector associated with 
each of the QE announcements. The P-value on the constant will give the significance of the 
cumulative abnormal returns across all companies in a sector. This test is better than the t-test 
as it allows us to use robust standard errors (Princeton University, 2008), which considers any 
form of heteroscedasticity in the residuals from Equation (10) above. The tables for the robust 
analysis are presented in Appendix E.  
The results for QE1 show that all the sectors that had significant CARs using two days, also 
have significant CARs with the expanded event window. Also, the signs did not change. 
Regressing equation (10) above shows that only 4 sectors had CARs that were significant. 
These sectors are General Industries, Food & Drug Retailers, Real Estate Investment Trust and 
Software & Computer Services. These sectors are also significant using equation (13) and have 
the same signs as results from equation (10). 
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In QE2, most of the sectors that had statistically significant CARs are the same as the ones with 
the 2-day event window. Only Construction & Materials had a different sign. Regressions 
based on equation (10) shows only Food & Drug Retailers had significant and abnormal 
returns. 
The expanded event window yielded the same results in QE3 as with the 2-day event window. 
However, the regression analysis shows that only Forestry & Paper had significant and 
abnormal CARs. 
In general, using equation (13) shows that our results are robust. There is little support to show 
robustness using equation (10). 
6.3 Investment Strategy for the JSE 
Here we discuss an investment for the JSE using the indices. Table 11 below shows the results 
for the benchmark portfolio. 
Table 11: Benchmark portfolio 
 
Our benchmark portfolio indicates that out of the 12 indices, only eight would have weight in 
our portfolio. The highest percentage would be in the All Share index with 72%. The other 
indices included are Top40 (7%), RESI20 (1.72%), INDI25 (1.53%), JASIN (0.94%), JBNKS 
(3.74%), mining index (1.32%) and the gold index (10.79%). Unfortunately, the portfolio 
would have a zero return with a risk of 3% and a very small coefficient of variation. 
TICKER WEIGHT
EXPECTED 
RETURN STD. DEV. BETAS
All Share Index ALSI 72,82% -0,10% 2,30%
Top40 Top40 7,14% -0,09% 2,29% 0,98
Financial and Industrial 30 FINDI30 0,00% 0,06% 0,87% 0,72
Resource 20 RESI20 1,72% -0,06% 1,31% 1,46
Financial 15 FINI15 0,00% 0,09% 0,96% 0,68
Industrial 25 INDI25 1,53% 0,04% 0,91% 0,73
Industrials JASIN 0,94% 0,05% 0,83% 0,67
All Share ex Resources JALEX 0,00% 0,06% 0,79% 0,66
Small Caps JSMLC 0,00% 0,06% 0,44% 0,25
Banks JBNKS 3,74% 0,08% 1,25% 0,71
Mid Caps MIDCAP 0,00% 0,06% 0,60% 0,48
Mining JMNNG 1,32% -0,06% 1,36% 1,49
Gold JGOLD 10,79% 0,06% 2,25% 0,78
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Despite having negative returns and a high risk, the ALSI is the favoured index in our 
benchmark. This can only be attributed to diversification benefits. As noted earlier, prior to the 
crash, the resources, industrials and the financial indices moved in the same direction. We see 
this also in the way solver allocates weights in these indices. In times of uncertainty, investing 
in gold is a good way to diversify risk due to its strength as a traditional store of value and 
liquidity. Globally, gold prices dropped during the financial crisis but then went steeply higher 
till September 2011. Mining forms a great part of the economy in SA. As seen from our sector 
analysis, the mining sector had significant CAR on the day of QE announcement implying the 
sector was doing well in 2008. To get a better understanding of why the indices were included 
in the portfolio, we calculate their betas. 
The reason why we calculate betas is to show the volatility of the indices in comparison to the 
market (ALSI). Also, beta is the only driver of returns above the risk-free rate and therefore, 
high beta stocks tend to be riskier but provide potential for higher returns. According to CAPM, 
higher expected returns should compensate for high risk. Despite having the highest return and 
low risk, the FINDI index is not included in the benchmark portfolio. The RESI index which 
has a negative return and a slightly higher risk is included. This is because of its high beta 
which shows potential for higher returns. This also applies for the mining index. 
Our benchmark represents a hypothetical portfolio that would have been made in 2008 when 
QE started. Bearing in mind that QE was to continue, we look at portfolios that would have 
applied during QE2 and QE3. We adjust the arithmetic means based on qualitative and 
quantitative assumptions identified below. The quantitative assumptions made were motivated 
by the abnormal returns calculated on the sectors in section 6.2.2. 
6.3.1. QE2 Portfolio 
Global uncertainty was still present in 2010 but there had been improvements in the financial 
markets. Our empirical analysis shows the sectors that lost or gained on the day of the 
announcement. We compound these losses or gains to make the adjustments on our indices. 
Assumptions made on the ALSI, Small Caps, Mid-Caps and Top40 are qualitative based on 
financial reviews.  
 According to the JSE website  (JSE, 2010), the ALSI had gained 13.86% during the year 2010, 
we therefore adjust our index by 5.6% to account for daily increase. We also increase the Top40 
by 2.24%. Financial reviews done on the indices show that for the period from June 2002-2010, 
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the midcaps and small caps index performed better than the Top40. Therefore, we increase 
these indices by 2.2% and 2.7% respectively. 
Table 12 below shows the results after the mean adjustments. 
Table 12: QE2 Portfolio 
 
After the adjustments, only three indices make it to the portfolio that could weather changes 
brought about by QE2. These are the All-share ex resources index, small caps index and the 
mining index. Despite the ALSI index having the second highest returns, it is not included in 
the portfolio. This is because it has the highest risk on the portfolio. The small caps index has 
the highest weight and this is because of its high returns and low risk. 
6.3.2. QE3 Portfolio 
Financial reviews show that in 2012, the mid-cap index performed better than the ALSI, the 
ALSI had gained around 26% by the end of the year. Platinum index was increased because 
the rand weakness helped to improve its prices. 















All Share Index ALSI -0,10% 72,82% 5,60% 0,00% 5,50%
Top40 Top40 -0,09% 7,14% 2,24% 0,00% 2,15%
Financial and Industrial 30 FINDI30 0,06% 0,00% 2,87% 0,00% 2,79%
Resource 20 RESI20 -0,06% 1,72% -0,68% 0,00% -0,77%
Financial 15 FINI15 0,09% 0,00% 0,73% 0,00% 0,61%
Industrial 25 INDI25 0,04% 1,53% 2,14% 0,00% 2,08%
Industrials JASIN 0,05% 0,94% 2,14% 0,00% 2,07%
All Share ex Resources JALEX 0,06% 0,00% 4,90% 20,16% 4,81%
Small Caps JSMLC 0,06% 0,00% 2,27% 65,44% 2,54%
Banks JBNKS 0,08% 3,74% 2,52% 0,00% -2,56%
Mid Caps MIDCAP 0,06% 0,00% 2,23% 0,00% 2,11%
Mining JMNNG -0,06% 1,32% 9,87% 14,40% 9,77%
Gold JGOLD 0,06% 10,79% 0,02% 0,00% 0,07%













Table 13: QE3 Portfolio 
 
Our results show that solver allocates all the weight to the small caps index. The returns of this 
index are less than those of the ALSI and the mid-caps index but upon further investigation, 
we find that it has the lowest risk in all the indices. 
In conclusion, we find that the small caps index is the favoured index in both QE2 and QE3. 


















All Share Index ALSI -0,10% 72,82% 10,40% 0,00% 10,30%
Top40 Top40 -0,09% 7,14% 4,20% 0,00% 4,11%
Financial and Industrial 30 FINDI30 0,06% 0,00% -9,17% 0,00% -9,25%
Resource 20 RESI20 -0,06% 1,72% -11,60% 0,00% -11,75%
Financial 15 FINI15 0,09% 0,00% -8,87% 0,00% -8,99%
Industrial 25 INDI25 0,04% 1,53% -0,30% 0,00% -0,36%
Industrials JASIN 0,05% 0,94% -0,30% 0,00% -0,37%
All Share ex Resources JALEX 0,06% 0,00% 1,20% 0,00% -1,29%
Small Caps JSMLC 0,06% 0,00% 10,50% 100,00% 10,24%
Banks JBNKS 0,08% 3,74% -9,87% 0,00% -9,90%
Mid Caps MIDCAP 0,06% 0,00% 11,00% 0,00% 10,91%
Mining JMNNG -0,06% 1,32% 3,74% 0,00% 3,64%
Gold JGOLD 0,06% 10,79% 2,17% 0,00% 2,22%
Platinum JPLAT -0,16% 0,00% 1,80% 0,00% 1,62%
Portfolio Risk 0,91%
Coefficient of variation 8,89%
QE3 PORTFOLIO
Portfolio Return 10,24%





7. Conclusion  
The aim of the study is to examine whether the announcements of QE resulted in listed 
companies in South Africa recording abnormal returns. To justify this study, we first explored 
what happened to the macroeconomy during the QE phase. Our exploratory analysis establishes 
that the major impact of QE to SA was the inflows to the bond market. We also note that some 
of the inflows were in the equity markets and therefore we proceed to check whether they 
resulted in abnormal returns for companies and sectors. 
Our empirical analysis shows that three companies had significant CARs in the three phases of 
QE. On the sector front, nine out of the 34 sectors had significant CARs every time QE was 
announced. A broader classification of these sectors into industries shows that the industries 
represented are industrials, consumer goods, consumer services and financials.  In QE1, the 
industrials industry and the consumer services industry had negative CARs but in QE2 and 
QE3, they had positive CARs. The consumer goods industry had positive CARs during the 
three phases of QE.  
Despite the construction industry undergoing a decline after the 2010 World Cup, the sector 
still managed to scoop abnormal returns during QE2 and QE3 announcement. This can be 
attributed to the fact that the construction industry is cyclical in nature and will do well when 
the economy is thriving. The contraction in economic activity after the financial crisis should 
have led to the consumer goods industry achieving negative abnormal returns, but this is not 
the case. The positive CARs in this sector can be explained by the fact that even if consumers 
were facing constraints on their disposable incomes, they still had to find ways to survive like 
making use of credit facilities. In addition, in order to accommodate cash-strapped consumers 
and remain competitive, retailers had to review their strategies. These strategies include 
diversifying their range of products and services and using multi-channel approaches. This is 
also the case for the consumer services industry. 
The South African Financial Sector has a limited exposure to foreign assets. Therefore, the 
impact from QE should have been negligible. However, the performance of this industry on 
the JSE is dependent on the direction of interest rates in South Africa. Our analysis shows that 
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most of the individual sectors were losing during every QE announcement. This can therefore 
be attributed to higher interest and inflation rates and a weaker rand. 
 
Owing to the dominance of the US economy and finance in global markets, spill overs of its 
monetary policy to the rest of the world are not surprising. We find that the impact of QE1 
announcement was negative. However, by the time QE2 was being done, the global macro 
financial environment was less dire and therefore there was no great impact to EMEs. Positive 
US QE shock brought down long-term yields in the US making investors reach for yields in 
emerging markets. In search for higher yielding assets in emerging markets, this caused capital 
flows to accelerate in these economies, bidding up asset prices such as stock prices and 
exchange rate and causing a decrease in long-term yields.  
The spill overs of QE to emerging markets were affected by the liquidity of the emerging 
economy and its fundamentals. In SA, domestic factors could have hampered the extent of the 
effect of QE on the JSE. The economy is faced with a large current account deficit, limited 
foreign currency reserves and low official interest rates. The threats of sovereign downgrade 
also had an impact on how foreign investors view SA. However, not all is negative on the 
domestic front. The World Economic Forum Global Competitive 2010 report listed South 
Africa as the first out of 138 countries when it comes to regulation of securities exchange; bank 
soundness came sixth while financing through the local equity market and the availability of 
financial services both came in seventh  (JSE, 2010). Therefore, capital flows to SA were 
beneficial in relaxing the external financing environment. 
The portfolio inflows from QE masked the underlying problems in SA’s economy. Therefore, 
if developed markets were to perform QE again, policy makers in SA should also focus on 
ensuring that SA’s fundamentals are not left unattended.  Improving the country’s 
fundamentals would help ensure that tail-risks are avoided when normalisation happens. 
In general, during the crisis, inflows turned to outflows but recovered in the second quarter of 
2009. This recovery took place as QE was being implemented. The effect on the rand 
appreciation and the abnormal returns of companies were much higher during the first 
announcement than in the second and third announcement. With regard to investing in the JSE 
using indices, the small caps index received higher weighting in both portfolios. This is due to 
having the lowest risk compared to all the indices on our portfolio. It can also be an indication 
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that small companies can make big moves and therefore have a high potential of growing their 
returns. 
This research concludes that QE1 had the greatest impact on the JSE and its impact was 
negative. QE2 had a positive impact on the JSE since most companies and sectors had 
significant positive CARs. The impact of QE3 on sector abnormal returns was almost neutral. 
This study only did an exploratory analysis on the macroeconomic and financial indicators. 
This provides further areas of study where one can test for the relationship between 
macroeconomic variables and stock returns with an emphasis of the QE period. Considering 
the SA economy had not improved much by the end of 2012, a further area of research that can 
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Appendix 
Appendix A: Stock and Indices description 
A-1: Stock Names 
Table 14: Stock Names 
Ticker Firm Name 
AVI AVI LTD 
ABL African Bank Investments Ltd 
ACE Accentuate Ltd 
ACP Acucap Properties Ltd 
ADI Adaptit Holdings Ltd 
AIP Adcock Ingram Holdings 
ADR Adcorp Holdings Ltd 
ANA Adrenna Prop Group Ltd 
ADH Advtech Ltd 
ADW African Dawn Capital 
AFE AECI Ltd 
AEE African Equity Empowerment 
AEG Aveng Group Ltd 
AOO African and Overseas Enterprises Ltd 
AOVP African and Overseas Enterprises Ltd 
AEA African Eagle Res Plc 
AON African ans Overseas Enterprise Ltd 
AFT Afrimat Ltd 
ACT Afrocentric Inc Corp 
AFX African Oxygen Ltd 
AHL Ah-Vest Ltd 
ALH Alaris Holdings Limited 
AET Alert Steel Holdings 
AEL Allied Elecctronics Corp-A 
AEN Allied Elecctronics Corp-N 
AME African Media Entertainment Ltd 
AER Amalgamated Elec Corp Ltd 
ANG Anglogold Ashanti Ltd 
AGL Anglo American Plc 
AMS Anglo American Platinum Corporation 
ANS Ansys 
ARH Arb Holdings Ltd 
AQP Aquarius Platinum Ltd 
ACL Arcelormittal SA Ltd 
ART Argent Industrial Ltd 
ARI African Rainbow Minerals 
APN Aspen Pharmacare Hldgs 
ASR Assore Ltd 
ARL Astral Foods 
APK Astrapak Ltd 
ATL Atlatsa Resources Corp 
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Ticker Firm Name 
AEG Aveng Ltd 
AWT Awethu Beverages Ltd 
BGA Barclays Africa Group Ltd 
BAW Barloworld Ltd 
BSR Basil Read Holdings Ltd 
BTI British AM. Tobacco 
BCX Business Connexion Group Ltd 
BEG Beige Holdings Ltd 
BEL Bell Equipment Holdings 
BVT The Bidvest Group Ltd 
BIL BHP Billiton Plc 
BLU Blue Label Telecoms Ltd 
BCF Bowler Metcalf Limited 
BAT Brait 
BIK Brikor Ltd 
BRN Brimstone Investment Corporation 
BRT Brimstone Investment Corporation 
BSS BSI Steel Ltd 
BDM Buildmax Limited 
BWI B & W Instrument & Elec LD 
CGR Calgro M3 Holdings Ltd 
CDZ Cadiz Holdings Ltd 
CAC CAFCA Ltd 
CPI Capitec  
CPF Capital Property Fund Limited 
CRG Cargo Carriers Limited 
CSB Cashbuild Limited 
CAT Caxton & CTP Publishers & Printers 
CATP Caxton & CTP Publishers & Printers 
CBH Country Bird Holdings 
CRD Central Rand Gold Ltd 
CSP Chemical Specialities Ltd 
CMO Chrometco 
CIL Consolidated Infrastructure Group 
CLH City Lodge Hotels Limited 
CLS Clicks Group Ltd 
CLI Clientele Ltd 
CMH Combined Motor Holdings Ltd 
CML  Coronation Fund Managers Ltd 
CZA Coal of Africa 
CGN  Cognition Holdings Ltd 
COM Comair Ltd 
CCL Compu Clearing Outsourcing Ltd 
CND Conduit Capital Ltd 
CNL Control Instruments Group Ltd 
CKS Crookes Brothers Ltd 
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Ticker Firm Name 
CSG CSG Holdings Limited 
CSP Chemical Specialities Ltd Pref 
CUL Culliana Holdings Ltd 
DTC Datatec Limited 
DAW Distribution and Warehouse Network Ltd 
DCT Datacentrix Holdings Ltd 
DRN Delrand Resources Ltd 
DTA Delta Emd Limited 
DMC Diamond Corp Plc 
DGC Digicore Holdings Limited 
DSY Discovery Holdings Ltd 
DST Distell 
DRD DrdGold Ltd 
EMH E Media Holdings Ltd - N 
EPS Eastern Platinum Limited 
ECS Ecsponent Limited 
EHS Evraz Highveld Steel & Van 
ELR Elb Group Limited 
ELI Ellies Holdings Ltd 
EMI Emira Estate Investment Trusts 
ENX Enx Group Ltd 
EOH EOH Ltd 
EQS Eqstra Holdings Ltd 
ERB Erbacon Inv Holdings 
ESR Esor Limited 
EXX Exxaro Resources Limited 
FVT Fairvest Property Holdings Limited 
FBR Famous  Brands Limited 
FGL Finbond Group Ltd 
FSR Firstrand Limited 
FUU First Uranium Corp 
FPT FountainHead Prop Trust 
GFI Goldfields Limited 
GIJ Gijima Group Ltd 
GGM Goliath Gold Mining 
GDN Gooderson Leisure Corp 
GPL Grand Parade Inv Ltd 
GND Grindrod Limited 
GRF Group Five Ltd 
GRT Growthpoint Properties Ltd 
HAR Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd 
HCI Hosken Consolidated Investments Limited 
HPA Hospitality Prop Fund - A 
HPB Hospitality Prop Fund - B 
HWN Howden Africa Holdings Limited 
HDC Hudaco Industries Limited 
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Ticker Firm Name 
HUG Huge Group Ltd 
HLM Hulamin Ltd 
HWA Hwange Colliery Company Ltd 
HYP Hyprop Investments Limited 
ILA Iliad Africa Limited 
ILV Illovo Sugar Limited 
ILE Imbalie Beauty Limited 
IMP Impala Platinum Holdings Limited 
IPL  Imperial Holdings Ltd 
IDQ Indequity Group Limited 
ING  Ingenuity Property Inv Ltd 
ISB Insimbi Ref & Alloy Sup Ltd 
IWE Interwaste Holdings Ltd 
ITU  Intuprop 
IVT  Invicta Holdings Limited 
INL  Investec Limited 
INP  Investec Plc 
ISA ISA Holdings Ltd 
ITE Italtile Ltd 
JSC Jasco Electronics Holdings Limited 
JDG JD Group Ltd 
JSE  JSE Ltd 
JBL  Jubilee Platinum Plc 
KAP KAP Industrial Holdings 
KDV  Kaydav Group Ltd 
KEH Keaton Energy Holdings 
KEL  Kelly Group Ltd 
KIO Kumba Iron Ore Ltd 
LAB Labat Africa Limited 
LEW Lewis Group Limited 
LBH Liberty Holdings Ltd Ord 
LHG Litha Healthcare Group Ltd 
LON  Lonmin 
LNF  London Finance an Investment Group 
MAS Masonite (Africa) Limited 
MSM  Massmart Holdings Ltd 
MZR  Mazor Group Ltd 
MED  Middle East Diamond resLtd  
MDC  Mediclinic Int 
MRF Merafe Resources Ltd 
MTA  Metair Investments Ord 
MML  Metmar Ltd 
MFL  Metrofile Holdings Ltd 
MRI Mine Restoration Investments Ltd 
MMH  Miranda Mineral Holdings 
MIX Mix Telematics Hldgs LD 
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Ticker Firm Name 
MMG  Micromega Holdings Ltd 
MMI  MMI Holdings Ltd 
MND Mondi Ltd 
MNP  Mondi Plc Ltd 
MNY  Moneyweb Holdings Ltd 
MOR Morvest Business Group Ltd 
MUR Murray & Roberts Holdings Ltd 
MRP Mr Price Group Limited 
MTN MTN Group Ltd 
MST Mustek Limited 
NPK  Nampak 
NPN Naspers Ltd 
NED Nedbank Group 
NT1 Net 1 UEPS INC 
NTC Netcare Ltd 
NHM  Northam Platinum Ltd Npl 
NCS Nictus Beperk 
NUT  Nutritional Holdings Ltd 
NWL Nu-World Holdings Limited 
OAO  Oando Plc 
OAS  Oasis Crescent Prop Fund 
OCE  Oceana Group Ltd 
OCT  Octodec Investments Limited 
OML  Old Mutual Plc 
OMN  Omina Holdings Limited 
OLG  Onelogix Group Limited 
ORE  Orion Real estate Ltd 
PGL  Pallinghurst Resources Ltd 
PAN Pan African Resource plc 
PGR  Peregrine Holdings Ltd 
PET  Petmin Ltd 
PHM Phumelela gaming and leisure Ltd 
PIK  Pick n Pay Limited 
PWK  Pick n Pay Holdings Limited 
PNC  Pinnacle Holdings Ltd 
PFG  Pioneer Food Group Ltd 
PPC  PPC Ltd 
PCT  Prescient Limited 
PMV Primeserv Group Ltd 
PSG PSG Group Ltd 
PSV  PSV Holdings Ltd 
PPE Purple Group Ltd 
PPR Putprop Ltd 
RBW Rainbow Chicken 
RCL  RCL Foods Limited 
RAR  Rare Holdings Ltd 
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Ticker Firm Name 
RBX Raubex Group Ltd 
RBA RBA Holdings Ltd 
RDF Redefine Properties Ltd 
REI Reinet Investment SCA 
REM Remgro Limited 
RES Resilient Property Income Fund 
RLO  Reunert Limited 
RTO Rex-Truefrom clothing company Limited 
CFR Compagnie Fin Richemont 
RMH  RMB Holdings Limited 
RDI Rockwell Diamonds Incor 
RLF  Rolfes Technology Hldngs 
SOH  South Ocean Holdings Ltd 
SAC SA Corporate Real Estate Limited 
SAB  Sabmiller 
SBV  Sabvest Limited 
SVN Sabvest Limited 
SAH  South African Coal Min 
SCL  Sacoil Holings Ld 
SLM  Sanlam Limited 
SNT  Santam 
SNV  Santova Limited 
SAP  Sappi Limited 
SFN  Sasfin Holdings Limited 
SOL  Sasol Limited 
SKY  Sea Kay Holdings Ltd 
SHP  Shoprite Holdings Ltd 
SVB Silverbridge Hldgs Ltd 
SOV  Sovereign Food Investments Limited 
SPA  Spanjaard Limited 
SPP  The Spar Group Ltd 
SUR  Spur Corporation Ltd 
SBK Standard Bank group Ltd 
SSK  Stefanutti Stocks Hld LD 
SNH Steinhoff Int Hldgs N.V 
SCP Stellar Capital Partners Ltd 
STA  Stratcorp Limited 
SUI  Sun International Ltd 
SPG  Super Group Ltd 
SYC Syfrets and Commercial Union Property Fund 
TAS Taste Holdings Ltd 
TAW Tawana Resources Ltd 
TLM Telemaster Holdings Ltd 
TKG  Telkom SA Ltd 
TFG The Foschini Group Ltd 
TBS Tiger Brands Ltd 
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Ticker Firm Name 
TON Tongaat Hulett Ltd 
TDH  Tradehold Ltd 
TMT  Trematon Capital Investments Limited 
TRE  Trencor Limited 
TPC  Transpaco Limited 
TSX  Trans Hex Group Limited 
TRU  Truworths International Ltd 
TSH Tsogo Sun Holdings Ltd 
VLE  Value Group Ltd 
VMK Verimark Holdings Ltd 
VIL  Village Main Reef Ltd 
VKE  Vukile Property Fund Limited 
VUN Vunani Ltd 
WBO  Wilson Bayly Holmes_Ovcon Ltd 
WEA  WG Wearne Ltd 
WSL  Wescoal Holdings Ltd 
WEZ  Wesizwe Platinum Ltd 
WHL Woolworths Hldgs Ltd 
WNH Winhold Limited 
WKF Workforce Holdings Ltd 
YRK  York Timber Holdings Ltd 
ZED Zeder Investments Ltd 
ZSA Zurich Insurance Co SA 
 
A – 2: Indices 
Table 15: Index names 
Ticker Index Name 
ALSI All Share Index 
Top40 Top40 
FINDI30  Financial and Industrial 30 
RESI20  Resource 20 
FINI15  Financial 15 
INDI25  Industrial 25 
JASIN  Industrials 
JALEX  All Share ex Resources 
JSMLC  Small Caps 
JBNKS  Banks 
MIDCAP  Mid-Caps 
JMNNG  Mining 
JGOLD  Gold 
JPLAT  Platinum 
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Appendix B. QE and Macroeconomy 
(A) GDP 
The first indicator we look at is the GDP growth rate. Error! Reference source not found. b
elow shows the growth rate of GDP from 2008 to 2014. What is not visible from the graph is 
that South Africa was experiencing a sustained acceleration in economic growth up until the 
global financial crisis of 2008-2009. The decrease in 2008/2009 with 2009 being declared as 
the first year the world was experiencing a recession since World War II (Verick & Islam, 
2010). However, a period of recovery followed and this is seen from the positive growth rates 
from 2010.  
Figure 4: SA quarterly GDP growth (%) and QE dates 
 
 
In the last quarter of 2008, SA’s GDP growth rate dropped to -1.8% and declined further to -
6.4% in the first quarter of 2009 and then to -3.2% in the second quarter (SARB Quarterly 
bulletin, 2009). These figures represent a technical recession despite the Finance Minister at 
that time, Trevor Manuel, having the view that SA would not be affected by the global recession 
(Mail & Guardian, 2009). 
When analysing if QE2 affected GDP, we look at the GDP growth in the third quarter of 2010 
since QE2 was announced in the third quarter of 2010. GDP growth increased by 2.6% in the 
third quarter (STATSA, 2010). Contributions to this growth were made by the following 
industries: mining and quarrying, motor trade, agriculture, fishing, finance and real estate. 
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There was slow growth in the economy during the third quarter of 2012. Real GDP grew at 
only 1.2%. This was affected mostly by the contraction in the mining industry. 
Our correlation matrix suggests that GDP in SA and in the USA, are positively correlated 
(98.6%). This means that an increase in the USA GDP would imply that South Africa’s GDP 
is also increasing. Figure 6 below shows how GDP growth in the US and GDP in SA compare. 
Figure 5:  Comparison of quarterly GDP growth for the US and SA 
 
Real GDP in SA and Real GDP in USA seem to be moving in the same direction. Before QE1, 
GDPs in both countries were going down. The subprime mortgage crisis and the banking 
liquidity crisis prior to 2008 had led to the contraction of real GDP in 2008. In SA, negative 
domestic developments contributed to the contraction. These included the debt-fuelled 
consumption boom, a surge in inflation during 2007 and 2008 that reduced competitiveness 
and pushed up interest rates and the fact that key infrastructure such as electricity could not 
keep up with demand (National Treasury, 2009). Phase two and three of QE did not seem to 
have much impact on SA real GDP but the US real GDP went down during the quarter in which 
both phases of QE were announced.   
(B) Inflation 
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Inflation in SA had remained above the target range for 21 consecutive months and exceeded 
the upper limit by 7.6 percentage points when it peaked in August 2008.  Prior to this period, 
SA was experiencing an economic expansion which led to an increase in spending fuelled by 
increasing debt levels. This placed an upward pressure on prices. In 2009, a combination of 
higher interest rates, international recession and new government credit regulations restrained 
inflation to 7.1 percent. It continued to fall in 2010 despite beginning to recover to level of 
4.3%. As the recovery, has continued, inflation has risen to stay within the target band. 
Figure 6 below shows that South Africa follows the global inflation trend with a lag. 
Figure 6: Month-on-month inflation rates (%) for SA and the US 
 
The graph above shows that SA inflation is very volatile. Disinflationary forces at work in the 
global economy spill over to SA and push down the inflation rate. Expansionary monetary 
policy is expected to increase inflation expectations.  
(C) Exchange rate 
Currency depreciation is an inevitable consequence of monetary easing (Santor & Suchanek 
2013). Significant volatility of the rand was experienced in October 2008. This was due to 
deterioration of export commodity prices and intensity of investors risk aversion. This 
unfortunately led to the disposal of domestic equity and debt securities by non-residents. Figure 
7 shows the relationship between the ZAR/USD exchange and the index that measures the 
volatility of emerging market currencies. In October 15, 2008, the rand experienced its worst 
daily change when it lost around 17.25% of its value  (Old Mutual Wealth , 2009).  
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Figure 7: Nominal exchange rate and volatility of EM currencies 
 
The year 2010 saw the rand strengthening against the dollar from July 2009. During 2010, the 
rand remained extremely volatile with an appreciating trend. The weighted average exchange 
rate decreased by 0.6% in both July and August. Factors that support this trend include an 
improvement in the current deficit, strong foreign capital inflows, higher commodity prices, 
dollar weakness, domestic economy recovery and a benign inflation outlook.  
Easier monetary policy stance of other central banks and the growth of the local bond market 
supported the rand in the beginning on the third quarter of 2012. However, the rand started 
losing ground from September 2012 following some local developments like labour unrest, 
downgrading of the country’s sovereign ratings, rising trade deficit and indications of a 
renewed pickup in inflation (SARB, 2012). Following the Fed’s speech on providing additional 
policy accommodations (a signal to QE3) the rand weakened against its major trading partners.  
 
(D) Portfolio investments 
Figure 8 provides the trend of portfolio flows into South Africa between 2008 and 2014. The 
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was substantially less than in the third quarter (R22.4 billion). Most of these can be attributed 
to the acquisition of equity in SA companies by non-residents (SARB, 2009). Foreign portfolio 
investment recorded an outflow as non-resident investors reduced their holdings in South 
African equity and debt.  On an annual basis, an inflow of R97. 4 billion had been recorded for 
2007 but this reverted to an outflow of R68.1 billion in 2008. This was the first annual outflow 
registered since 2001 (SARB, 2010).  
The financial account recorded capital inflows of R195.1 billion in 2008 compared to the net 
inflows of R193.8 registered in 2007.  In the third quarter of 2010, SA attracted inflows 
amounting to R27.6 billion. The net cumulative inflow for the first three quarters of 2010 was 
R98.7 billion compared to R92.4 billion for the same period in 2009 (SARB, 2010). Most of 
the inflows recorded in the financial account in the third quarter of 2010 were in the bond 
market. 
Since the fourth quarter of 2009, non-resident investors had an increased appetite for South 
African debt. Between the second and third quarter of 2010, these acquisitions had more than 
doubled. Acquisitions on the domestic equity front had also increased somewhat and this was 
partly due to a rights issue by a South African gold-mining company (SARB, 2010). 
Figure 8: Portfolio investments 
 
Stable conditions in the financial markets globally encouraged individual and institutional 
investors to increase their offshore portfolio investments. The strengthening of the rand also 
contributed to this. 
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The third quarter of 2012 saw an increase in portfolio investments of 27.5 billion compared to 
R22.7 billion in the second quarter. However, investors substituted their listed equity 
investments with domestically issued debt. Interest in the bond market was also heightened by 
the issuance of an international bond by a state-owned enterprise 
(E) Equity market 
Total equity capital in the domestic and international primary share markets by companies 
listed by the JSE was at R76.7 billion in 2008 which was its lowest annual level since 2008 
(SARB, 2009). This decrease is attributed the downward pressure on share prices due to the 
turmoil in the financial markets. A record-high of R33.4 billion was seen in the net sales of 
non-residents in the fourth quarter of 2008 compared to R17.1 billion in the third quarter. This 
intense selling of South African shares increased global risk aversion and slowed down 
economic growth. 
During the third quarter of 2010, SA companies stepped up acquisitions and capitalisations on 
their subsidiaries abroad. This was especially the case in the mining, property and health-
sectors.  
Equity capital raised in 2010 on the JSE was R50.7 billion which is 48% lower than what was 
raised in 2009. Despite share prices drifting higher, lower volumes were traded. This caused a 
decline in turnover leading to a decline in market liquidity. The exposure of non-residents to 
the local share market remained restrained for most of 2010. For the first ten months of 2010, 
cumulative net sales of South African listed shares by non-residents was R21.7 billion 
compared to R70.7 billion over the same period in 2009. The industrial sector performed best 
as the domestic-orientated constituents benefited from the appreciating value in the rand.  
Despite improvement in the domestic equity in 2012, non-residents continued to be net sellers 
of domestic listed shares and this could be attributed to the depressed global economic 
performance and the unrest in the mining sector. 
84 | P a g e  
 
Figure 9: Performance of JSE all share index and S&P 500 index 
 
Figure 9 above shows the performance of the JSE All Share index and the S&P 500. Correlation 
between these two inices is estimated at 97.25% (see appendix). Global financial meltdown 
began on 15th September 2008 when Lehman Brothers collapsed. The S&P 90 (the precursor 
of S&P 500) fell by  86 percent on a month-end basis (Kaplan et al., 2009). By November 
2008, both S&P 500 and the JSE all share index had reached a record low. Both indices go up 
after QE1 announcement and this seems to be the impact when QE is announced. 
(F) Bond Market 
During the fourth quarter of 2008, non-resident net sales were at R26.2 billion compared to an 
amount of R21.7 billion in October 2008 (SARB, 2009). This reduction in bond holdings could 
be attributed to flight by international investors to familiarity, liquidity considerations and 
declining bond yields with the hope of improvement in inflation expectations.  
In 2010, the bond market benefited significantly from capital inflows as non-residents sought 
to gain from higher yields. Net purchases of domestic bonds in the third quarter stood at R41.1 
billion following from R20.1 billion in the second quarter (SARB, 2010). Factors in 2010 that 
helped drive down bond yields were continued provision of liquidity to the financial system 
and foreign appetite of South African bonds due to their yield advantage, a lower interest rate 
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In August 2012, bond yields came under upward pressure as the Marikana mining strike began 
and the rand value depreciated. Inclusion of SA bonds to the Citibank WGBI did not yield great 
results as this was overshadowed by the downgrade of the country’s sovereign credit ratings 
by Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s (S&P). Acquisition for local debt by non-residents 
remained strong through most of 2012. 
Figure 10: Correlations of the 10-year Treasury bond yields for SA and US 
 
The correlation between the SA 10-year bond and the USA 10-year bond is estimated at 
63.46%. From Figure 10 above we can see that both bond yields move almost in a similar 






Appendix C: Results for Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Companies 
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1 ACL Industrial Metals & Mining 0,0087 -0,0013 -0,0067 
2 ACP Real Estate Investment Trusts 0,0072 0,0102 0,1497 
3 ACT Health care Equipment & Services -0,0506 -0,1655 -2,5029** 
4 ADH General Retailers  0,0031 0,0086 0,503 
5 ADI Software & Computer Services 0 -0,0921 -4,8708*** 
6 ADR Support Services 0 0,0442 1,7698* 
7 AEE General Industries 0,0156 -0,0314 -0,8048 
8 AEG Construction & Materials 0,0563 0,0516 0,5564 
9 AEL Electronic & Electrical Equipment 0,1362 0,0458 0,3621 
10 AEN Electronic & Electrical Equipment 0,0398 0,0458 0,5675 
11 AER Electronic & Electrical Equipment 0 -0,0361 -0,3999 
12 AFE Chemicals 0,0228 0,0291 0,9819 
13 AFT Construction & Materials -0,02 -0,1547 -10,5228*** 
14 AFX Chemicals -0,0048 -0,1339 -2,0260** 
15 AGL Industrial Metals & Mining 0,1374 -0,0019 -0,0379 
16 AME Media 0 0,1568 1,6498* 
17 AMS Mining 0,0478 0,008 0,0883 
18 ANA Real Estate Investment & Services 0 -0,1124 -3,5503*** 
19 ANG Mining -0,0463 0,1389 0,8189 
20 AON General Retailers  0 0,0014 0,2896 
21 AOO General Retailers  0 -0,0339 
-
733,2610*** 
22 AOVP General Retailers  0 -0,2373 -6,9668*** 
23 APK General Industries 0,0142 0,0468 1,7028* 
24 APN Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 0 -0,0687 -1,9460* 
25 AQP Mining 0,0892 0,0997 1,9542* 
26 ARH Electronic & Electrical Equipment 0 -0,0366 -1,8383* 
27 ARI Industrial Metals & Mining 0,0311 -0,0566 -0,6342 
28 ARL Food Producers 0,0037 0,039 0,444 
29 ART Industrial Metals & Mining 0,0364 0,0885 1,4183 
30 ASR Industrial Metals & Mining 0,0417 0,1268 2,5848*** 
31 ATL Mining -0,1004 0,0043 0,0179 
32 AVI Food Producers 0,0282 -0,0366 -0,5853 
33 AWT Beverages 0 0,2447 2,1239** 
34 BAT General Financial 0,0162 0,0125 0,5854 
35 BAW General Industries 0,0127 -0,0086 -0,1202 
36 BCF General Industries -0,0238 -0,047 -0,8946 
37 BCX Software & Computer Services 0,0133 -0,0884 -3,0741*** 
38 BDM Construction & Materials 0,0526 -0,0013 -0,0076 
39 BEL Industrial Engineering -0,0401 -0,2589 -3,6005*** 
40 BGA Banks 0,0625 -0,0221 -0,7229 
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41 BIL Industrial Metals & Mining 0,1972 0,1493 1,5153 
42 BLU Mobile Communications 0,0326 0,0216 0,3862 
43 BRN Equity Investment Instruments 0,0411 -0,0263 -0,3228 
44 BRT Equity Investment Instruments -0,03 -0,0244 -0,9033 
45 BSR Construction & Materials -0,0172 0,0303 0,3776 
46 BVT General Industries 0,0108 -0,135 -3,7578*** 
47 CAC Electronic & Electrical Equipment 0 0 0 
48 CAT Media -0,0417 -0,171 -2,6502*** 
49 CATP Media 0 0 0 
50 CCL Software & Computer Services 0 -0,0404 -3,8111*** 
51 CDZ General Financial 0 -0,0861 -1,9851** 
52 CFR Leisure Goods 0,0599 -0,0713 -1,4091 
53 CGN Software & Computer Services 0 -0,1988 -1,5762 
54 CGR Construction & Materials -0,0408 -0,1749 -0,9519 
55 CKS Food Producers 0 0,0501 9,5306*** 
56 CLH Travel & Leisure 0,029 0,0218 0,5387 
57 CLS Food & Drug Retailers 0,0352 -0,0892 -2,4579** 
58 CMH General Retailers  0 0,075 4,8727*** 
59 CML General Financial 0,0289 0,0102 0,1771 
60 CND General Financial -0,111 0,0933 0,5138 
61 COM Travel & Leisure 0,0125 -0,1179 -1,0167 
62 CPF Real Estate Investment Trusts 0,0101 0,0416 1,2737 
63 CPI Banks -0,0081 -0,0585 -2,7995*** 
64 CRD Mining 0 -0,079 -2,6457*** 
65 CRG Industrial Transportation 0 0,003 3,7159*** 
66 CSB General Retailers  0,0099 -0,066 -2,4075** 
67 CUL Travel & Leisure 0 0,0637 29,8918** 
68 CZA Industrial Metals & Mining 0,0952 -0,0321 -0,2746 
69 DAW Construction & Materials -0,0357 -0,1862 -2,7126*** 
70 DCT Software & Computer Services 0,0353 -0,0385 -0,4922 
71 DGC Electronic & Electrical Equipment 0,0333 0,0425 0,3997 
72 DRD Mining 0,025 0,2246 1,5813 
73 DST Beverages 0,0435 -0,0409 -0,7499 
74 DSY Life Insurance 0,0114 -0,0241 -0,5464 
75 DTA Chemicals -0,0588 0,0055 0,056 
76 DTC Software & Computer Services 0,0292 -0,0512 -1,7893* 
77 EHS Industrial Metals & Mining 0,0907 0,0033 0,0267 
78 ELI Electronic & Electrical Equipment 0,0494 -0,2238 -1,2733 
79 ELR Support Services 0 -0,0338 -3,8407*** 
80 EMH Personal Goods  -0,0204 0,0448 1,352 
81 EMI Real Estate Investment & Services 0,0233 0,0502 1,3492 
82 ENX Support Services 0 -0,064 -2,5807*** 
83 EOH Software & Computer Services -0,0073 -0,0163 -1,8745* 
84 EPS Mining 0 0,2101 1,0643 
85 ESR Construction & Materials 0,0455 -0,1173 -2,3054** 
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86 EXX Mining 0,1619 0,1028 1,0095 
87 FBR Travel & Leisure 0 -0,0074 -0,6766 
88 FGL Banks 0 -0,0608 -0,3624 
89 FPT Real Estate Investment & Services 0,0059 0,0463 1,0177 
90 FSR Banks 0,0631 0,0613 2,4850** 
91 FVT Real Estate Investment & Services 0 -0,0749 -1,0239 
92 GFI Mining 0,0308 0,2633 1,4362 
93 GGM Industrial Metals & Mining 0 -0,0618 -4,4202*** 
94 GIJ Software & Computer Services 0,0426 -0,0762 -1,9268* 
95 GND Industrial Transportation -0,0254 -0,1296 -2,1784** 
96 GRF Construction & Materials 0,0538 0,0698 1,2202 
97 GRT Real Estate Investment Trusts 0,0993 -0,0287 -0,2589 
98 HAR Mining 0,0101 0,2527 1,3007 
99 HCI Equity Investment Instruments -0,0056 -0,0345 -2,3598** 
100 HDC Industrial Engineering 0,0177 -0,0662 -2,0211** 
101 HPA Real Estate Investment Trusts 0,0009 0,0564 1,8069* 
102 HPB Real Estate Investment Trusts 0 0,0038 0,0685 
103 HWA Mining -0,053 0,014 0,2973 
104 HWN Industrial Engineering 0 -0,1637 -1,7916* 
105 HYP Real Estate Investment Trusts 0,0271 0,0494 1,5641 
106 ILA Support Services -0,0579 -0,1376 -2,1733** 
107 ILV Food Producers 0,0526 -0,0052 -0,0794 
108 IMP Mining 0,1047 0,1662 5,5105*** 
109 ING Real Estate Investment & Services 0 0,0096 1,6234 
110 INL General Financial 0,0058 -0,0903 -0,6189 
111 INP General Financial 0,0591 -0,0209 -0,1908 
112 IPL Industrial Transportation 0,0159 -0,0688 -0,9615 
113 ITE General Retailers  -0,0364 -0,0272 -0,7597 
114 ITU Real Estate Investment & Services 0,0343 -0,0569 -1,1024 
115 IVT Industrial Engineering 0 0,006 0,1633 
116 JBL Mining 0,05 0,0208 0,4088 
117 JDG General Retailers  0,0282 -0,0743 -2,1261** 
118 JSC Electronic & Electrical Equipment 0,0333 -0,0534 -1,4744 
119 JSE General Financial 0,0199 -0,0803 -4,0127*** 
120 KAP General Industries -0,04 -0,0874 -1,7306* 
121 KDV Construction & Materials 0,1765 -0,0271 -0,096 
122 KIO Industrial Metals & Mining 0,1259 0,037 0,225 
123 LBH Life Insurance 0,0306 -0,0251 -0,4089 
124 LEW General Retailers  0,0005 -0,0127 -0,1995 
125 LHG Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 0 -0,0445 -2,1807** 
126 LNF General Financial 0 -0,0004 -0,2682 
127 LON Mining 0,0317 -0,0445 -1,1382 
128 MAS Construction & Materials 0 -0,0657 -3,2433*** 
129 MDC Health care Equipment & Services 0,0164 -0,0244 -5,6915*** 
130 MED Mining 0 -0,3574 -1,1784 
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131 MFL Support Services 0,0482 -0,054 -0,4548 
132 MIX Support Services 0,0169 -0,1269 -3,2082*** 
133 MMG Support Services 0 0,0487 5,1293*** 
134 MMI Life Insurance 0,01 -0,0541 -1,6113 
135 MML Industrial Metals&Mining 0,0577 -0,0382 -0,4311 
136 MND Forestry&Paper 0,0172 -0,1669 -1,5479 
137 MNP Forestry&Paper 0,0171 -0,0866 -0,8137 
138 MOR Software & Computer Services -0,0256 -0,1679 -1,2376 
139 MRF Industrial Metals&Mining -0,0313 -0,1402 -0,7695 
140 MRP General Retailers  0,0403 -0,1397 -3,7830*** 
141 MSM General Retailers  0,0256 -0,0969 -2,1285** 
142 MST Technology Hardware & Equipment 0,1355 -0,0515 -0,2464 
143 MTA Automobiles & Parts 0 -0,0209 -0,6193 
144 MTN Mobile Communications 0,006 -0,1431 -1,8354* 
145 MUR Construction & Materials 0,017 0,1009 0,9992 
146 MZR Construction & Materials 0 -0,0056 -0,2142 
147 NCS General Retailers  0 0,0223 12,9641*** 
148 NED Banks 0,0291 -0,0549 -1,0438 
149 NHM Mining 0,0092 -0,2996 -5,2398*** 
150 NPK General Industries -0,0423 -0,1116 -1,3459 
151 NPN Media 0 -0,101 -1,4463 
152 NTC Health care Equipment & Services 0,0343 -0,0133 -0,243 
153 NWL 
Household Goods and Home 
Construction 
0 -0,0742 -2,4528** 
154 OAO Oil Equipment & Services 0 -0,0769 -1,0783 
155 OCE Food Producers 0,0223 0,02 0,9476 
156 OCT Real Estate Investment & Services 0,0098 0,0197 1,1336 
157 OLG Industrial Transportation 0 0,1259 1,0022 
158 OML Life Insurance 0,0425 -0,2462 -2,9582*** 
159 OMN Chemicals 0,0134 -0,1089 -2,9531*** 
160 ORE Real Estate Investment & Services 0 0,2112 1,5803 
161 PAN Mining -0,08 -0,0248 -0,1708 
162 PCT Equity Investment Instruments -0,0909 -0,1101 -0,6682 
163 PET Industrial Metals&Mining 0 -0,0432 -1,0008 
164 PGR General Financial 0,0248 -0,1292 -5,6991*** 
165 PHM Travel & Leisure 0 -0,0647 -1,7751* 
166 PIK Food & Drug Retailers 0,0509 -0,1106 -1,8213* 
167 PMV Support Services 0,0667 0,0734 1,1131 
168 PNC Technology Hardware & Equipment -0,03 -0,0764 -1,2482 
169 PPC Construction & Materials 0,0645 -0,0663 -1,4355 
170 PPE Equity Investment Instruments -0,0667 0,2569 1,3587 
171 PPR Real Estate Investment & Services 0 0,0048 16,9528*** 
172 PSG General Financial 0,0385 -0,0223 -0,4826 
173 RBW Food Producers -0,0257 0,0295 0,3451 
174 RBX Construction & Materials -0,0144 -0,0779 -1,2323 
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175 RCL Food Producers -0,0257 0,0295 0,345 
176 RDF Real Estate Investment Trusts 0,0364 0,0426 1,2709 
177 RDI Mining 0 -0,2711 -1,4778 
178 REM General Industries 0,0137 -0,0668 -3,7251*** 
179 RES Real Estate Investment Trusts 0,0158 0,001 0,0938 
180 RLF Chemicals -0,0672 -0,1135 -1,4727 
181 RLO Electronic & Electrical Equipment 0,0753 0,0745 2,5920*** 
182 RMH Banks 0,0667 -0,0249 -0,512 
183 RTO General Retailers  0 -0,1114 -6,6981*** 
184 SAB Beverages 0,0081 -0,0547 -1,3554 
185 SAC Real Estate Investment Trusts 0,0173 0,0478 1,0053 
186 SAP Forestry&Paper 0,0423 -0,1253 -2,0075** 
187 SBK Banks 0,0738 -0,0269 -0,6847 
188 SBV Equity Investment Instruments 0 0,0055 1,1871 
189 SCL Oil Equipment & Services 0 -0,1532 -1,2243 
190 SCP Equity Investment Instruments 0,0091 0,0082 0,5572 
191 SFN General Financial 0 -0,0348 -0,3627 
192 SHP Food & Drug Retailers 0,0413 -0,1417 -2,5130** 
193 SLM Life Insurance 0,0356 -0,0991 -1,7752* 
194 SNH 
Household Goods and Home 
Construction 
0,0187 -0,1855 -6,3019*** 
195 SNT Nonlife Insurance 0,0156 -0,0482 -3,1134*** 
196 SNV Support Services 0,4 0,179 0,3951 
197 SOH Electronic & Electrical Equipment 0,0154 -0,1268 -2,4709** 
198 SOL Chemicals 0,1131 0,0383 0,4767 
199 SOV Food Producers 0,0417 0,0467 0,467 
200 SPA Chemicals 0 -0,0637 -6,0731*** 
201 SPG Support Services 0,0185 -0,0482 -0,5028 
202 SPP Food & Drug Retailers 0,021 -0,0202 -1,8057* 
203 SSK Construction & Materials 0,0214 0,0309 0,9845 
204 SUI Travel & Leisure 0,0841 -0,0053 -0,0632 
205 SUR Travel & Leisure -0,0203 -0,0749 -2,0073** 
206 SVN Equity Investment Instruments 0 0 0 
207 SYC Real Estate Investment & Services 0,0063 -0,0287 -0,843 
208 TAS General Retailers  -0,1307 0,2362 0,762 
209 TAW Mining 0 0,8046 1,074 
210 TBS Food Producers 0,0481 -0,0289 -0,9449 
211 TDH Real Estate Investment & Services 0 -0,0258 -2,1996** 
212 TFG General Retailers  0,0465 -0,0315 -0,5945 
213 TKG Fixed Line Telecommunications 0,0224 0,0066 0,5296 
214 TMT Equity Investment Instruments 0 -0,1057 -4,2332*** 
215 TON Food Producers -0,0117 -0,0506 -1,3429 
216 TPC General Industries 0 -0,0835 -3,4003*** 
217 TRE Industrial Transportation 0 -0,1321 -3,6629*** 
218 TRU General Retailers  0,0148 -0,1144 -5,2730*** 
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219 TSH Travel & Leisure 0,0839 0,0334 0,4162 
220 TSX Mining 0,0278 -0,0074 -0,5248 
221 VIL Mining 0 -0,0421 -4,6658*** 
222 VKE Real Estate Investment & Services 0,0167 0,0198 1,093 
223 VLE Industrial Transportation 0 -0,0731 -4,8484*** 
224 VMK General Retailers  0 -0,0296 -0,2265 
225 WBO Construction & Materials 0,0069 0,0216 0,3879 
226 WEZ Mining -0,0043 -0,0239 -0,3958 
227 WHL General Retailers  0,056 0,0469 0,7352 
228 WNH Support Services 0 0,0711 0,6452 
229 WSL Mining -0,0143 -0,0999 -1,0637 
230 YRK Forestry&Paper 0 0,0419 0,6754 
231 ZED General Financial -0,0322 0,0551 0,3656 
232 ZSA Nonlife Insurance 0 0,0049 10,8339*** 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 17: Cumulative Abnormal Returns QE2 – Companies 
  Ticker Sector Name 
Stock 
returns CAR t-stat 
1 ACL Industrial Metals&Mining -0,0112 -0,0265 -3,7192*** 
2 ACP Real Estate Investment Trusts -0,005 -0,0063 -0,9729 
3 ACT Health care Equipment & Services 0 -0,0254 -0,2113 
4 ADH General Retailers  0 0,0074 0,665 
5 ADI Software & Computer Services 0 0,0159 0,6241 
6 ADR Support Services 0,0126 -0,0066 -0,2308 
7 AEE General Industries 0 -0,0278 -0,669 
8 AEG Construction & Materials 0,0169 0,0222 0,8525 
9 AEL Electronic & Electrical Equipment 0,0117 0,0016 0,0565 
10 AEN Electronic & Electrical Equipment -0,0141 0,0086 0,3088 
11 AER Electronic & Electrical Equipment -0,0253 -0,0365 -1,2479 
12 AFE Chemicals -0,0029 0,0067 0,6026 
13 AFT Construction & Materials 0,0032 -0,0285 -1,3411 
14 AFX Chemicals -0,0227 -0,061 -11,3661*** 
15 AGL Industrial Metals&Mining 0,0134 -0,0118 -0,3714 
16 AME Media 0 0,0051 0,2467 
17 AMS Mining -0,0194 0,0177 0,6959 
18 ANA Real Estate Investment & Services 0 0,0084 1,1244 
19 ANG Mining -0,0122 -0,0012 -0,0521 
20 AON General Retailers  0 -0,0165 -1,568 
21 AOO General Retailers  0 -0,0024 -11,1530*** 
22 AOVP General Retailers  0 0 0 
23 APK General Industries 0 -0,0766 -1,57 
24 APN Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology -0,0002 0,0048 0,1086 
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25 AQP Mining 0,0076 0,0494 7,7636*** 
26 ARH Electronic & Electrical Equipment 0 -0,0125 -0,2446 
27 ARI Industrial Metals&Mining -0,0268 -0,0083 -0,198 
28 ARL Food Producers 0,0005 0,0131 1,5484 
29 ART Industrial Metals&Mining 0 -0,0257 -1,1913 
30 ASR Industrial Metals&Mining 0 -0,0104 -0,2441 
31 ATL Mining 0 0,0083 0,1089 
32 AVI Food Producers -0,0004 -0,0207 -0,956 
33 AWT Beverages 0 0 0 
34 BAT General Financial 0,019 0,0329 1,4661 
35 BAW General Industries 0,0036 0,0064 0,3538 
36 BCF General Industries -0,0047 -0,0077 -1,0112 
37 BCX Software & Computer Services 0 0,0048 1,1179 
38 BDM Construction & Materials 0,0345 0,1171 1,4164 
39 BEL Industrial Engineering 0 0,0074 1,1202 
40 BGA Banks -0,004 0,0033 0,1313 
41 BIL Industrial Metals&Mining -0,0147 -0,0096 -0,3984 
42 BLU Mobile Communications -0,0217 0,0583 0,8433 
43 BRN Equity Investment Instruments 0 0,0108 1,2588 
44 BRT Equity Investment Instruments 0 0,0086 21,7800*** 
45 BSR Construction & Materials -0,0043 -0,0033 -1,1464 
46 BVT General Industries -0,0019 -0,0014 -0,2918 
47 CAC Electronic & Electrical Equipment 0 0 0 
48 CAT Media -0,014 -0,0163 -1,2745 
49 CATP Media 0 0 0 
50 CCL Software & Computer Services 0,0245 0,0136 0,4508 
51 CDZ General Financial -0,0149 -0,0187 -0,4992 
52 CFR Leisure Goods -0,0018 -0,0196 -1,1121 
53 CGN Software & Computer Services 0 -0,0066 -0,4747 
54 CGR Construction & Materials -0,0682 -0,0201 -0,1814 
55 CKS Food Producers 0 -0,018 -1,3749 
56 CLH Travel & Leisure -0,0081 -0,0206 -3,4117*** 
57 CLS Food & Drug Retailers 0,0161 0,0453 9,7179*** 
58 CMH General Retailers  0 -0,0076 -1,1697 
59 CML General Financial -0,0047 -0,0054 -0,4113 
60 CND General Financial 0,0399 0,0507 0,8442 
61 COM Travel & Leisure 0 -0,0074 -0,3125 
62 CPF Real Estate Investment Trusts -0,0013 -0,0035 -0,5024 
63 CPI Banks 0,0023 -0,0071 -0,7614 
64 CRD Mining 0 0,1208 1,1561 
65 CRG Industrial Transportation 0,0278 0,0245 0,7625 
66 CSB General Retailers  0 -0,0012 -0,0935 
67 CUL Travel & Leisure 0 0,0409 4,6370*** 
68 CZA Industrial Metals&Mining -0,0124 0,0089 0,2415 
69 DAW Construction & Materials 0 0,0066 0,8469 
70 DCT Software & Computer Services 0 -0,0133 -0,8978 
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71 DGC Electronic & Electrical Equipment 0,0196 0,0073 0,2275 
72 DRD Mining 0,0099 0,0429 2,6718*** 
73 DST Beverages -0,0099 -0,0421 -3,9580*** 
74 DSY Life Insurance 0,0073 -0,0259 -0,6316 
75 DTA Chemicals 0,0056 -0,0414 -0,9492 
76 DTC Software & Computer Services 0,0055 0,0233 0,5205 
77 EHS Industrial Metals&Mining -0,0111 -0,0154 -0,6606 
78 ELI Electronic & Electrical Equipment 0 0,0196 0,2153 
79 ELR Support Services 0 -0,0013 -0,5094 
80 EMH Personal Goods  -0,0182 -0,0166 -0,7933 
81 EMI Real Estate Investment & Services 0 -0,0029 -0,6967 
82 ENX Support Services 0 0,0637 0,8046 
83 EOH Software & Computer Services -0,0044 -0,0005 -0,0276 
84 EPS Mining 0 0,1522 0,8487 
85 ESR Construction & Materials 0,0213 -0,0388 -0,4697 
86 EXX Mining -0,0049 -0,0023 -0,2625 
87 FBR Travel & Leisure 0,0104 0,0042 0,3212 
88 FGL Banks 0 -0,0371 -2,0214** 
89 FPT Real Estate Investment & Services 0 0,0005 0,0267 
90 FSR Banks -0,0096 0,0011 0,0471 
91 FVT Real Estate Investment & Services 0 -0,0094 -0,3057 
92 GFI Mining 0,0069 0,0287 1,0468 
93 GGM Industrial Metals&Mining 0 0,0521 0,7937 
94 GIJ Software & Computer Services -0,061 -0,0461 -0,5993 
95 GND Industrial Transportation -0,0026 0,0193 1,3324 
96 GRF Construction & Materials -0,0197 0,0242 0,3314 
97 GRT Real Estate Investment Trusts 0,0048 0,0042 0,2532 
98 HAR Mining -0,0061 0,0115 0,3362 
99 HCI Equity Investment Instruments -0,0053 -0,0004 -0,0073 
100 HDC Industrial Engineering 0,0206 0,022 0,8894 
101 HPA Real Estate Investment Trusts 0,0106 0,02 0,6464 
102 HPB Real Estate Investment Trusts 0,022 0,0358 1,7048* 
103 HWA Mining 0 0,0163 1,6341 
104 HWN Industrial Engineering 0 -0,0704 -0,9606 
105 HYP Real Estate Investment Trusts 0,0015 0,004 1,8404* 
106 ILA Support Services 0,0205 -0,0071 -0,1317 
107 ILV Food Producers 0,013 0,0138 0,6981 
108 IMP Mining -0,0254 -0,0228 -0,5234 
109 ING Real Estate Investment & Services 0 -0,0685 -0,8602 
110 INL General Financial -0,01 0,0114 0,6579 
111 INP General Financial -0,0158 0,003 0,0521 
112 IPL Industrial Transportation 0,0184 0,0285 1,2497 
113 ITE General Retailers  -0,0556 -0,0499 -0,489 
114 ITU Real Estate Investment & Services 0,0068 0,0147 0,5873 
115 IVT Industrial Engineering 0 -0,0113 -0,2738 
116 JBL Mining 0,0317 0,0194 0,3687 
117 JDG General Retailers  0,017 0,0297 1,8759* 
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118 JSC Electronic & Electrical Equipment 0,0385 0,0364 0,8215 
119 JSE General Financial -0,0076 -0,0057 -0,2724 
120 KAP General Industries -0,005 0,0071 0,2854 
121 KDV Construction & Materials 0 -0,0088 -11,1530*** 
122 KIO Industrial Metals&Mining -0,0065 -0,0087 -0,3502 
123 LBH Life Insurance -0,0139 -0,0163 -0,988 
124 LEW General Retailers  0,021 0,0217 0,6608 
125 LHG Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 0 0,009 0,2808 
126 LNF General Financial 0 0,1637 0,8777 
127 LON Mining -0,0058 0,0349 1,2607 
128 MAS Construction & Materials 0 -0,0027 -0,6719 
129 MDC Health care Equipment & Services -0,0076 -0,0158 -7,8499*** 
130 MED Mining 0 0,0045 1,1568 
131 MFL Support Services 0 -0,0008 -0,3291 
132 MIX Support Services -0,0217 -0,0318 -1,6975* 
133 MMG Support Services 0 0,0725 0,5944 
134 MMI Life Insurance -0,0186 -0,0109 -0,5329 
135 MML Industrial Metals&Mining -0,0411 0,0109 0,1287 
136 MND Forestry&Paper 0,0196 0,0284 0,5518 
137 MNP Forestry&Paper 0,0177 0,0172 0,3573 
138 MOR Software & Computer Services 0 0,0641 0,6207 
139 MRF Industrial Metals&Mining -0,0154 0,0279 1,574 
140 MRP General Retailers  0,0332 0,0564 2,0094** 
141 MSM General Retailers  0,0391 0,0405 0,8547 
142 MST Technology Hardware & Equipment 0 0,0168 0,4246 
143 MTA Automobiles & Parts -0,005 -0,0347 -1,3236 
144 MTN Mobile Communications 0,0019 -0,0097 -0,5757 
145 MUR Construction & Materials -0,0238 0,012 0,228 
146 MZR Construction & Materials 0 0,0137 0,7386 
147 NCS General Retailers  0 -0,0236 -0,5947 
148 NED Banks -0,0029 0,0082 0,6699 
149 NHM Mining -0,0074 0,0043 0,1042 
150 NPK General Industries 0,0046 0,0058 0,426 
151 NPN Media -0,0082 0,003 0,0597 
152 NTC Health care Equipment & Services -0,0045 -0,0123 -1,489 
153 NWL 
Household Goods and Home 
Construction 0 -0,0234 
-2,4979** 
154 OAO Oil Equipment & Services 0 -0,0639 -0,8084 
155 OCE Food Producers 0 0 0,0095 
156 OCT Real Estate Investment & Services -0,0006 -0,0031 -0,3901 
157 OLG Industrial Transportation -0,03 0,1042 0,602 
158 OML Life Insurance 0,0107 -0,0181 -0,3757 
159 OMN Chemicals 0,0239 -0,0002 -0,0042 
160 ORE Real Estate Investment & Services 0 0,0101 0,3343 
161 PAN Mining 0,0526 0,0464 0,7618 
162 PCT Equity Investment Instruments -0,1667 -0,1368 -0,6591 
163 PET Industrial Metals&Mining 0 0,0163 0,341 
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164 PGR General Financial 0,0368 0,0439 1,0168 
165 PHM Travel & Leisure 0 0,0052 1,3521 
166 PIK Food & Drug Retailers 0,0156 0,0132 0,7135 
167 PMV Support Services 0 -0,0189 -0,1446 
168 PNC Technology Hardware & Equipment 0,0109 0,0361 0,6993 
169 PPC Construction & Materials -0,002 0,0009 0,0423 
170 PPE Equity Investment Instruments 0 -0,0065 -3,2563*** 
171 PPR Real Estate Investment & Services 0 -0,0094 -0,4844 
172 PSG General Financial 0,0099 0,0067 0,509 
173 RBW Food Producers 0,0461 0,0561 1,0957 
174 RBX Construction & Materials 0,0057 -0,0024 -0,1067 
175 RCL Food Producers 0,0461 0,0561 1,0955 
176 RDF Real Estate Investment Trusts 0,0107 0,0133 1,1 
177 RDI Mining 0 -0,3564 -0,8744 
178 REM General Industries -0,0065 -0,0027 -0,167 
179 RES Real Estate Investment Trusts 0,0007 0,0037 2,3255** 
180 RLF Chemicals 0 -0,0176 -3,5625*** 
181 RLO Electronic & Electrical Equipment -0,0044 -0,0039 -0,6698 
182 RMH Banks 0 0,0208 0,8088 
183 RTO General Retailers  0 -0,0106 -7,0679*** 
184 SAB Beverages -0,0159 -0,0143 -1,0874 
185 SAC Real Estate Investment Trusts 0,0098 -0,004 -0,2161 
186 SAP Forestry&Paper 0,003 -0,0353 -0,8305 
187 SBK Banks -0,0045 -0,0145 -1,2975 
188 SBV Equity Investment Instruments 0 -0,0015 -2,5955*** 
189 SCL Oil Equipment & Services 0,0127 0,0519 0,2846 
190 SCP Equity Investment Instruments -0,0357 0,0511 0,4724 
191 SFN General Financial 0 -0,0115 -0,6444 
192 SHP Food & Drug Retailers 0,0099 0,0068 0,3341 
193 SLM Life Insurance 0,0009 0,0047 0,1861 
194 SNH 
Household Goods and Home 
Construction -0,0011 0,0093 
1,7801* 
195 SNT Nonlife Insurance 0 -0,0053 -0,7435 
196 SNV Support Services -0,1429 -0,1743 -0,9806 
197 SOH Electronic & Electrical Equipment 0 -0,037 -1,4918 
198 SOL Chemicals -0,0037 -0,0157 -1,0853 
199 SOV Food Producers -0,0096 -0,0129 -3,5868*** 
200 SPA Chemicals 0 0 0 
201 SPG Support Services 0 0,045 0,9324 
202 SPP Food & Drug Retailers 0,0081 0,0046 0,4379 
203 SSK Construction & Materials -0,0051 0,0158 1,4062 
204 SUI Travel & Leisure 0,0088 0,0144 1,3024 
205 SUR Travel & Leisure -0,0017 -0,0199 -0,5441 
206 SVN Equity Investment Instruments 0 0 0 
207 SYC Real Estate Investment & Services 0 -0,0007 -0,2022 
208 TAS General Retailers  0 -0,022 -0,4262 
209 TAW Mining 0 0,0014 0,1392 
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210 TBS Food Producers 0,0054 0,0372 4,0548*** 
211 TDH Real Estate Investment & Services 0 -0,0236 -3,5530*** 
212 TFG General Retailers  0,0207 0,0394 2,3486** 
213 TKG Fixed Line Telecommunications 0,0074 0,0296 3,0482*** 
214 TMT Equity Investment Instruments 0,022 -0,0544 -0,5905 
215 TON Food Producers 0 -0,0186 -1,6925* 
216 TPC General Industries -0,0179 -0,0375 -1,0956 
217 TRE Industrial Transportation 0 0,0396 0,7752 
218 TRU General Retailers  0,0291 0,0169 0,345 
219 TSH Travel & Leisure 0 -0,0193 -0,8661 
220 TSX Mining 0,0104 0,0104 0,4976 
221 VIL Mining 0 -0,0197 -41,7736*** 
222 VKE Real Estate Investment & Services 0,0068 0,0018 0,0769 
223 VLE Industrial Transportation 0 -0,0005 -0,2693 
224 VMK General Retailers  0 0,0046 0,252 
225 WBO Construction & Materials -0,0009 0,0437 0,481 
226 WEZ Mining -0,0058 -0,0019 -0,0294 
227 WHL General Retailers  0,0211 0,041 2,0925** 
228 WNH Support Services 0 0,0238 1,3906 
229 WSL Mining -0,0252 -0,0662 -0,4615 
230 YRK Forestry&Paper -0,006 -0,0018 -0,1206 
231 ZED General Financial 0,0149 0,0213 1,4267 
232 ZSA Nonlife Insurance 0 0 2,2559** 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 18: Cumulative Abnormal returns QE3 – Companies 
  Ticker Sector Name 
Sector 
returns CAR t-stat 
1 ACL Industrial Metals&Mining -0,0109 -0,0386 -1,4872 
2 ACP Real Estate Investment Trusts -0,0042 0,0118 0,4462 
3 ACT Health care Equipment & Services 0,0136 -0,0072 -0,3449 
4 ADH General Retailers  0 0,0273 0,7697 
5 ADI Software & Computer Services 0 0,0167 0,1648 
6 ADR Support Services 0,0015 -0,0163 -1,0001 
7 AEE General Industries 0,0333 -0,0002 -0,0034 
8 AEG Construction & Materials -0,0277 -0,0389 -2,6193*** 
9 AEL Electronic & Electrical Equipment 0,0009 0,0124 1,8712 
10 AEN Electronic & Electrical Equipment -0,0013 0,0327 0,8206 
11 AER Electronic & Electrical Equipment -0,0113 -0,1301 -1,7672* 
12 AFE Chemicals -0,017 -0,0201 -0,7113 
13 AFT Construction & Materials 0 0,0484 1,2883 
14 AFX Chemicals -0,0005 0,0145 1,0865 
15 AGL Industrial Metals&Mining -0,0184 -0,0253 -1,1129 
16 AME Media 0 -0,0003 -2,0146** 
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17 AMS Mining -0,0023 0,0695 4,7725*** 
18 ANA Real Estate Investment & Services 0 0,0552 2,3580** 
19 ANG Mining -0,0155 -0,008 -0,2589 
20 AON General Retailers  0,1515 0,1509 1,1197 
21 AOO General Retailers  0 0 0 
22 AOVP General Retailers  0,0012 0,0012 1,118 
23 APK General Industries 0,0061 0,0312 1,5346 
24 APN Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology -0,0007 0,0133 1,4743 
25 AQP Mining -0,023 0,1223 1,351 
26 ARH Electronic & Electrical Equipment 0,0345 0,0387 1,3987 
27 ARI Industrial Metals&Mining -0,021 -0,0424 -4,2459*** 
28 ARL Food Producers 0 0,0197 2,7901*** 
29 ART Industrial Metals&Mining -0,0214 -0,0099 -0,5738 
30 ASR Industrial Metals&Mining 0,0032 0,0221 0,4272 
31 ATL Mining 0 0,0743 2,5975*** 
32 AVI Food Producers 0,0172 0,0386 1,6607* 
33 AWT Beverages 0 0,1627 0,7005 
34 BAT General Financial -0,0018 -0,0151 -3,0282*** 
35 BAW General Industries -0,0039 -0,0442 -2,3486** 
36 BCF General Industries 0 0,046 2,0642** 
37 BCX Software & Computer Services 0,0021 0,0725 1,9033* 
38 BDM Construction & Materials 0,1538 0,0125 0,0712 
39 BEL Industrial Engineering -0,0311 -0,0146 -0,4689 
40 BGA Banks -0,0143 0,0237 0,8384 
41 BIL Industrial Metals&Mining 0,0052 0,0142 0,6497 
42 BLU Mobile Communications 0,0131 0,1166 3,5549*** 
43 BRN Equity Investment Instruments 0 -0,0173 -1,9601** 
44 BRT Equity Investment Instruments 0 -0,0275 -1,6049 
45 BSR Construction & Materials -0,0146 -0,1527 -1,5574 
46 BVT General Industries -0,0128 -0,0181 -1,2747 
47 CAC Electronic & Electrical Equipment 0 0 0 
48 CAT Media 0 0,0013 0,0304 
49 CATP Media 0 0,0032 8,2036*** 
50 CCL Software & Computer Services 0 -0,0217 -0,7957 
51 CDZ General Financial -0,0111 -0,0224 -0,9192 
52 CFR Leisure Goods -0,0036 0,0037 0,1952 
53 CGN Software & Computer Services -0,0179 -0,0205 -0,4588 
54 CGR Construction & Materials -0,0127 -0,0452 -0,759 
55 CKS Food Producers 0 -0,0019 -0,6273 
56 CLH Travel & Leisure -0,0043 0,0514 2,3919** 
57 CLS Food & Drug Retailers -0,017 0,0087 0,4021 
58 CMH General Retailers  0 0,0434 1,1643 
59 CML General Financial -0,0027 -0,0084 -0,5104 
60 CND General Financial 0 0,0764 1,2425 
61 COM Travel & Leisure 0 -0,0453 -1,2046 
62 CPF Real Estate Investment Trusts 0,0076 -0,0046 -0,1089 
63 CPI Banks 0,008 0,0226 1,2004 
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64 CRD Mining -0,1667 -0,061 -0,3132 
65 CRG Industrial Transportation 0 -0,0012 -2,4461** 
66 CSB General Retailers  0,0065 0,0294 2,4864** 
67 CUL Travel & Leisure 0 -0,0692 -9,2134*** 
68 CZA Industrial Metals&Mining -0,0149 -0,1549 -3,5168*** 
69 DAW Construction & Materials 0,0015 0,0071 0,35 
70 DCT Software & Computer Services -0,0019 0,0531 2,7727*** 
71 DGC Electronic & Electrical Equipment -0,0165 -0,0419 -2,3480** 
72 DRD Mining -0,0039 0,0424 0,9863 
73 DST Beverages -0,0031 0,0024 0,0805 
74 DSY Life Insurance -0,0189 0,0134 0,4621 
75 DTA Chemicals -0,0538 0,0358 0,3533 
76 DTC Software & Computer Services 0,007 -0,0075 -0,3885 
77 EHS Industrial Metals&Mining 0 0,0245 1,2103 
78 ELI Electronic & Electrical Equipment -0,0312 -0,0713 -2,2917** 
79 ELR Support Services 0,0238 -0,0305 -0,7598 
80 EMH Personal Goods  -0,0143 -0,0379 -2,1614** 
81 EMI Real Estate Investment & Services 0,0015 0,0112 0,8774 
82 ENX Support Services 0 0,0607 1,4724 
83 EOH Software & Computer Services -0,0011 0,0258 1,0678 
84 EPS Mining -0,0083 -0,0178 -0,6499 
85 ESR Construction & Materials 0,041 0,1531 1,1194 
86 EXX Mining -0,0113 -0,0476 -1,5392 
87 FBR Travel & Leisure 0,0094 0,0372 3,9970*** 
88 FGL Banks 0 -0,1292 -0,5428 
89 FPT Real Estate Investment & Services 0,0168 -0,0051 -0,2004 
90 FSR Banks 0,0018 -0,0032 -0,1918 
91 FVT Real Estate Investment & Services 0 -0,0338 -2,9172*** 
92 GFI Mining -0,0047 -0,0352 -1,4435 
93 GGM Industrial Metals&Mining -0,025 -0,0125 -0,704 
94 GIJ Software & Computer Services 0,0476 0,0241 0,1787 
95 GND Industrial Transportation 0,0662 0,1209 2,2229** 
96 GRF Construction & Materials -0,0049 0,0347 1,275 
97 GRT Real Estate Investment Trusts 0,0099 -0,006 -0,2869 
98 HAR Mining 0,0042 0,0127 0,1785 
99 HCI Equity Investment Instruments -0,0106 0,009 0,3474 
100 HDC Industrial Engineering 0,0091 0,0237 1,1421 
101 HPA Real Estate Investment Trusts 0 0,0127 0,2787 
102 HPB Real Estate Investment Trusts 0 -0,1091 -1,5139 
103 HWA Mining 0 0,0322 94,0925*** 
104 HWN Industrial Engineering 0 -0,0012 -0,112 
105 HYP Real Estate Investment Trusts 0,0035 0,0027 0,3167 
106 ILA Support Services 0,0019 0,0251 2,5514** 
107 ILV Food Producers -0,004 0,0203 1,5514 
108 IMP Mining -0,0069 0,0301 1,9395* 
109 ING Real Estate Investment & Services 0 -0,1247 -1,2157 
110 INL General Financial -0,014 -0,0412 -2,3911** 
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111 INP General Financial -0,0148 -0,0334 -1,141 
112 IPL Industrial Transportation 0,0172 0,0691 2,4794** 
113 ITE General Retailers  0,0141 -0,0139 -0,3675 
114 ITU Real Estate Investment & Services -0,0023 -0,0074 -0,7953 
115 IVT Industrial Engineering 0,0001 0,0013 0,0767 
116 JBL Mining 0,0252 -0,0114 -0,1476 
117 JDG General Retailers  -0,0077 -0,0342 -2,5593** 
118 JSC Electronic & Electrical Equipment 0 0,0058 0,059 
119 JSE General Financial -0,0034 -0,0252 -2,3118** 
120 KAP General Industries 0,0201 0,0016 0,0265 
121 KDV Construction & Materials -0,0154 0,1449 0,88 
122 KIO Industrial Metals&Mining -0,0031 -0,0152 -0,616 
123 LBH Life Insurance 0,0095 -0,0222 -0,9388 
124 LEW General Retailers  0,0089 0,0144 1,0566 
125 LHG Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 0,0053 -0,011 -0,3765 
126 LNF General Financial 0 0 0 
127 LON Mining -0,0366 0,0272 0,4337 
128 MAS Construction & Materials 0 0,0101 4,6143*** 
129 MDC Health care Equipment & Services 0,012 0,0033 0,1934 
130 MED Mining 0,1556 0,0294 0,0941 
131 MFL Support Services -0,0278 -0,045 -0,9565 
132 MIX Support Services -0,0039 0,0105 0,2559 
133 MMG Support Services -0,05 0,0088 0,0602 
134 MMI Life Insurance -0,0016 -0,0143 -1,2674 
135 MML Industrial Metals&Mining 0 0,0069 0,3566 
136 MND Forestry&Paper -0,0152 -0,0392 -3,3997*** 
137 MNP Forestry&Paper -0,0167 -0,0392 -3,6910*** 
138 MOR Software & Computer Services -0,1 0,007 0,0463 
139 MRF Industrial Metals&Mining -0,0122 -0,0192 -0,5221 
140 MRP General Retailers  -0,0056 0,0027 0,1219 
141 MSM General Retailers  0,003 0 -0,0024 
142 MST Technology Hardware & Equipment -0,0017 -0,0121 -0,814 
143 MTA Automobiles & Parts 0,0222 0,116 2,7885*** 
144 MTN Mobile Communications -0,0033 0,0206 0,781 
145 MUR Construction & Materials -0,0117 -0,0247 -1,2504 
146 MZR Construction & Materials 0 0,0048 1,8737* 
147 NCS General Retailers  0 0,1346 1,9085* 
148 NED Banks 0,0019 0,0073 0,4418 
149 NHM Mining 0,018 0,1431 2,4660** 
150 NPK General Industries 0,0097 0,012 0,4967 
151 NPN Media -0,0124 -0,0181 -1,8217* 
152 NTC Health care Equipment & Services -0,0153 -0,0185 -1,0143 
153 NWL 
Household Goods and Home 
Construction 0 0,0075 
3,6466*** 
154 OAO Oil Equipment & Services 0 -0,0226 -0,3248 
155 OCE Food Producers -0,0009 -0,0216 -0,4554 
156 OCT Real Estate Investment & Services 0 0,0213 0,6354 
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157 OLG Industrial Transportation -0,0159 0,005 0,1919 
158 OML Life Insurance 0,0013 -0,0035 -0,2011 
159 OMN Chemicals 0 0,0158 0,8663 
160 ORE Real Estate Investment & Services 0 -0,0857 -1,6821* 
161 PAN Mining 0 0,0441 2,1315** 
162 PCT Equity Investment Instruments 0 0,0186 1,3542 
163 PET Industrial Metals&Mining -0,0227 -0,0596 -1,9581* 
164 PGR General Financial 0,0089 -0,0103 -0,5966 
165 PHM Travel & Leisure 0,0057 0,0335 7,8009*** 
166 PIK Food & Drug Retailers -0,009 0,0244 0,7976 
167 PMV Support Services 0 -0,0874 -1,5339 
168 PNC Technology Hardware & Equipment 0 -0,027 -1,5595 
169 PPC Construction & Materials -0,0105 0,0642 3,9911*** 
170 PPE Equity Investment Instruments 0 -0,037 -1,1089 
171 PPR Real Estate Investment & Services 0 -0,0173 -0,9642 
172 PSG General Financial -0,0057 -0,0316 -1,7345* 
173 RBW Food Producers 0 0,0228 0,5513 
174 RBX Construction & Materials 0 0,007 0,765 
175 RCL Food Producers 0 0,0228 0,5513 
176 RDF Real Estate Investment Trusts 0,0033 -0,0139 -0,6059 
177 RDI Mining 0 0,0116 2,0954** 
178 REM General Industries -0,0077 -0,0279 -3,8086*** 
179 RES Real Estate Investment Trusts 0,0043 -0,0062 -0,5053 
180 RLF Chemicals 0 -0,1123 -1,5567 
181 RLO Electronic & Electrical Equipment -0,0135 -0,0425 -2,2450** 
182 RMH Banks -0,0022 -0,0118 -0,9296 
183 RTO General Retailers  0 0,0008 1,0044 
184 SAB Beverages -0,001 -0,0047 -0,2666 
185 SAC Real Estate Investment Trusts 0,0107 0,0155 1,1649 
186 SAP Forestry&Paper -0,0113 -0,0321 -1,6324 
187 SBK Banks -0,0049 -0,0081 -0,6482 
188 SBV Equity Investment Instruments 0 -0,0115 -1,5462 
189 SCL Oil Equipment & Services 0 -0,065 -1,2987 
190 SCP Equity Investment Instruments -0,0312 -0,0354 -0,7535 
191 SFN General Financial 0 0,0023 0,4874 
192 SHP Food & Drug Retailers 0,006 0,0457 3,8148*** 
193 SLM Life Insurance -0,0104 -0,0235 -3,5008*** 
194 SNH 
Household Goods and Home 
Construction 0,0016 0,0164 
2,1108** 
195 SNT Nonlife Insurance 0,0078 0,0304 1,6248 
196 SNV Support Services -0,0575 0,0153 0,172 
197 SOH Electronic & Electrical Equipment 0 -0,1002 -1,8017* 
198 SOL Chemicals -0,0028 0,0051 0,3985 
199 SOV Food Producers 0 0,0127 0,6243 
200 SPA Chemicals 0 -0,0248 -1,2532 
201 SPG Support Services -0,0239 0,0037 0,0705 
202 SPP Food & Drug Retailers -0,0004 0,018 0,4496 
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203 SSK Construction & Materials 0 0,0131 1,2032 
204 SUI Travel & Leisure 0,002 0,0186 4,7554*** 
205 SUR Travel & Leisure -0,0196 0,0208 0,5875 
206 SVN Equity Investment Instruments 0 -0,0035 -0,3822 
207 SYC Real Estate Investment & Services -0,0111 0,021 0,5601 
208 TAS General Retailers  0,0363 -0,0629 -0,7811 
209 TAW Mining 0 -0,3015 -1,3693 
210 TBS Food Producers 0,0096 0,0252 1,0077 
211 TDH Real Estate Investment & Services 0,0385 -0,0067 -0,1251 
212 TFG General Retailers  -0,0042 0,0073 0,5723 
213 TKG Fixed Line Telecommunications 0,0047 0,0875 1,4492 
214 TMT Equity Investment Instruments 0 0,0038 1,6444* 
215 TON Food Producers -0,0077 -0,0399 -2,0966** 
216 TPC General Industries -0,0578 -0,0463 -0,8994 
217 TRE Industrial Transportation 0,0125 -0,0015 -0,0768 
218 TRU General Retailers  -0,0199 -0,0433 -1,8827* 
219 TSH Travel & Leisure -0,0125 -0,0277 -1,6789* 
220 TSX Mining 0,0252 -0,0601 -0,7338 
221 VIL Mining -0,0145 -0,0174 -0,2582 
222 VKE Real Estate Investment & Services 0 -0,0066 -0,6865 
223 VLE Industrial Transportation 0,0098 -0,0095 -0,4245 
224 VMK General Retailers  -0,0112 -0,0026 -0,3205 
225 WBO Construction & Materials -0,0075 -0,0082 -0,4789 
226 WEZ Mining 0,0175 0,0635 0,7656 
227 WHL General Retailers  -0,0119 0,0718 1,6047 
228 WNH Support Services -0,0187 -0,043 -0,9027 
229 WSL Mining -0,0109 -0,1049 -2,3450** 
230 YRK Forestry&Paper 0 -0,0263 -1,0546 
231 ZED General Financial 0 -0,0041 -0,271 
232 ZSA Nonlife Insurance 0 -0,0128 -18,2532*** 











Appendix D: Summary statistics for Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Table 19: QE1 Summary statistics 
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Table 21: QE3 Summary Statistics 
QE1 QE1
CARs_ Firms CARs_ Sectors
Percentiles      Smallest Percentiles      Smallest
1%    -,2711145       -,357381 1%    -,7697699      -,7697699
5%    -,1710128       -,357381 5%    -,5844917      -,7697699
10%    -,1349925       -,357381Obs 405,768 10%    -,5844917      -,7697699 Obs 405,768
25%    -,0766524       -,357381Sum of Wgt. 405,768 25%    -,4485664      -,7697699 Sum of Wgt, 405,768
50%    -,0270076 Mean -0,02292 50%    -,1867734 Mean -0,11151
Largest Std, Dev, 0,109904 Largest Std, Dev, 0,463173
75%     ,0220508       ,8045873 75%     ,0372157       1,060258
90%     ,0733888       ,8045873Variance 0,012079 90%     ,2241646       1,060258 Variance 0,21453
95%     ,1568309       ,8045873Skewness 1,899493 95%     1,060258       1,060258 Skewness 1,309277
99%     ,2569087       ,8045873Kurtosis 16,42298 99%     1,060258       1,060258 Kurtosis 4,430798
QE2 QE2
CARs_Firms CARs_Sectors
Percentiles      Smallest Percentiles      Smallest
1%    -.1367657      -.3564323 1%    -.1344203      -.1344203
5%    -.0460928      -.3564323 5%    -.1292188      -.1344203
10%    -.0278368      -.3564323Obs 405,768 10%    -.1291394      -.1344203 Obs 405,768
25%    -.0123907      -.3564323Sum of Wgt. 405,768 25%    -.0359177      -.1344203 Sum of Wgt. 405,768
50%     .0002737 Mean .0018942 50%     .0085389 Mean .0362279
Largest Std. Dev. .0422569 Largest Std. Dev. .1072033
75%     .0163031       .1636902 75%     .1061454       .2923863
90%     .0409544       .1636902Variance .0017856 90%     .1516476       .2923863 Variance .0114926
95%     .0560978       .1636902Skewness -2.423955 95%     .2923863       .2923863 Skewness .4290435
99%     .1207645       .1636902Kurtosis 26.85798 99%     .2923863       .2923863 Kurtosis 2.811806























Appendix E: Results for the robust analysis 
QE3 QE3
CARs_Firms CARs_Sectors
Percentiles      Smallest Percentiles      Smallest
1%    -.1526691      -.3014874 1%    -.3099078      -.3099078
5%    -.0857021      -.3014874 5%    -.3099078      -.3099078
10%    -.0450034      -.3014874Obs 405,768 10%    -.1785607      -.3099078 Obs 405,768
25%    -.0222672      -.3014874Sum of Wgt. 405,768 25%    -.1008677      -.3099078 Sum of Wgt. 405,768
50%            0 Mean -.0004868 50%    -.0180553 Mean -.0033881
Largest Std. Dev. .0519989 Largest Std. Dev. .1695556
75%     .0208584       .1627041 75%     .0986702        .326701
90%     .0483601       .1627041Variance .0027039 90%     .2302869        .326701 Variance .0287491
95%     .0764068       .1627041Skewness -.556943 95%      .326701        .326701 Skewness .1825863
99%      .150939       .1627041 Kurtosis 8.896768 99%      .326701        .326701 Kurtosis 2.526775
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1 570 Oil Equipment & Services 0 -0,235 -2,832***
2 1350 Chemicals 0,003 -0,148 -3,764***
3 1730 Forestry&Paper 0,019 -0,301 -4,598***
4 1750 Industrial Metals&Mining 0,061 0,323 8,674***
5 1770 Mining 0,013 1,004 22,925***
6 2350 Construction & Materials 0,023 -0,624 -46,506***
7 2720 General Industries -0,004 -0,552 -27,414***
8 2730 Electronic & Electrical Equipment 0,038 -0,283 -14,101***
9 2750 Industrial Engineering -0,006 -0,447 -9,375***
10 2770 Industrial Transportation -0,002 -0,22 -7,560***
11 2790 Support Services 0,045 -0,208 -5,061***
12 3350 Automobiles & Parts 0 -0,059 -1,423
13 3530 Beverages 0,017 0,177 4,685***
14 3570 Food Producers 0,013 0,022 2,389**
15 3720 Household Goods and Home Construction 0,009 -0,273 -9,822***
16 3740 Leisure Goods 0,06 -0,086 -1,969**
17 3760 Personal Goods -0,02 0,055 1,904*
18 4530 Health care Equipment & Services 0 -0,191 -5,777***
19 4570 Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 0 -0,11 -5,178***
20 5330 Food & Drug Retailers 0,037 -0,453 -14,844***
21 5370 General Retailers 0,003 -0,727 -36,195***
22 5550 Media -0,01 -0,113 -3,232***
23 5750 Travel & Leisure 0,024 -0,076 -3,492***
24 6530 Fixed Line Telecommunications 0,022 -0,006 -0,37
25 6570 Mobile Communications 0,019 -0,058 -0,933
26 8350 Banks 0,041 -0,114 -3,178***
27 8530 Nonlife Insurance 0,008 -0,011 -0,601
28 8570 Life Insurance 0,026 -0,451 -12,338***
29 8630 Real Estate Investment & Services 0,008 0,425 14,837***
30 8670 Real Estate Investment Trusts 0,024 0,339 20,037***
31 8770 General Financial 0,004 -0,115 -3,087***
32 8980 Equity Investment Instruments -0,016 0,268 7,165***
33 9530 Software & Computer Services 0,01 -0,571 -13,849***
34 9570 Technology Hardware & Equipment 0,053 -0,222 -2,786***
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1














1 570 Oil Equipment & Services 0,006329 -0,129 -0,99
2 1350 Chemicals 3,88E-05 -0,058 -1,442
3 1730 Forestry&Paper 0,008568 -0,074 -2,220**
4 1750 Industrial Metals&Mining -0,00968 -0,067 -1,624
5 1770 Mining 0,000302 0,147 1,796*
6 2350 Construction & Materials -0,00265 -0,166 -2,634***
7 2720 General Industries -0,00309 -0,069 -2,156**
8 2730 Electronic & Electrical Equipment 0,002599 -0,202 -4,610***
9 2750 Industrial Engineering 0,005141 -0,02 -0,532
10 2770 Industrial Transportation 0,002261 0,315 5,540***
11 2790 Support Services -0,01195 -0,058 -0,736
12 3350 Automobiles & Parts -0,00498 -0,043 -2,087**
13 3530 Beverages -0,0086 -0,083 -3,402***
14 3570 Food Producers 0,010092 0,161 5,715***
15 3720 Household Goods and Home Construction -0,00055 -0,022 -1,393
16 3740 Leisure Goods -0,00179 -0,023 -1,354
17 3760 Personal Goods -0,01818 0,102 1,098
18 4530 Health care Equipment & Services -0,00403 0,002 0,031
19 4570 Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology -0,00012 0,044 2,152**
20 5330 Food & Drug Retailers 0,012436 0,178 7,721***
21 5370 General Retailers 0,006982 0,166 4,373***
22 5550 Media -0,00555 -0,028 -0,564
23 5750 Travel & Leisure 0,00119 0,592 4,315***
24 6530 Fixed Line Telecommunications 0,00741 0,014 0,656
25 6570 Mobile Communications -0,0099 0,091 2,135**
26 8350 Banks -0,00268 -0,073 -3,880***
27 8530 Nonlife Insurance 0 -0,013 -2,142**
28 8570 Life Insurance -0,00271 -0,031 -0,937
29 8630 Real Estate Investment & Services 0,001079 -0,116 -5,599***
30 8670 Real Estate Investment Trusts 0,005983 0,039 2,227**
31 8770 General Financial 0,005634 0,11 1,900*
32 8980 Equity Investment Instruments -0,02064 -0,175 -2,270**
33 9530 Software & Computer Services -0,00394 -0,05 -1,015
34 9570 Technology Hardware & Equipment 0,005435 -0,008 -0,176
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1









1 570 Oil Equipment & Services 0 -0,088 -1,423
2 1350 Chemicals -0,011 -0,086 -1,924*
3 1730 Forestry&Paper -0,011 -0,137 -6,795***
4 1750 Industrial Metals&Mining -0,011 -0,31 -9,501***
5 1770 Mining -0,003 0,037 0,379
6 2350 Construction & Materials 0,006 0,23 3,067***
7 2720 General Industries -0,001 -0,046 -1,31
8 2730 Electronic & Electrical Equipment -0,004 -0,296 -5,987***
9 2750 Industrial Engineering -0,005 0,009 0,44
10 2770 Industrial Transportation 0,015 0,183 5,408***
11 2790 Support Services -0,014 -0,098 -1,681*
12 3350 Automobiles & Parts 0,022 0,116 2,789***
13 3530 Beverages -0,001 0,16 1,219
14 3570 Food Producers 0,001 0,099 3,707***
15 3720 Household Goods and Home Construction 0,001 0,024 4,392***
16 3740 Leisure Goods -0,004 0,004 0,195
17 3760 Personal Goods -0,014 -0,038 -2,161**
18 4530 Health care Equipment & Services 0,003 -0,022 -1,141
19 4570 Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 0,002 0,002 0,096
20 5330 Food & Drug Retailers -0,005 0,097 3,619***
21 5370 General Retailers 0,009 0,327 7,197***
22 5550 Media -0,003 -0,014 -0,631
23 5750 Travel & Leisure -0,002 0,019 0,857
24 6530 Fixed Line Telecommunications 0,005 0,088 1,449
25 6570 Mobile Communications 0,005 0,137 4,431***
26 8350 Banks -0,001 -0,099 -1,189
27 8530 Nonlife Insurance 0,004 0,018 1,205
28 8570 Life Insurance -0,004 -0,05 -2,596***
29 8630 Real Estate Investment & Services 0,004 -0,179 -4,281***
30 8670 Real Estate Investment Trusts 0,004 -0,097 -2,742***
31 8770 General Financial -0,004 -0,113 -5,003***
32 8980 Equity Investment Instruments -0,005 -0,101 -4,736***
33 9530 Software & Computer Services -0,007 0,149 2,102**
34 9570 Technology Hardware & Equipment -0,001 -0,039 -2,512**
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
